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Improving Access to Justice
by Enforcing the Free Speech Clause
Michele Cotton†
INTRODUCTION
State laws against the “unauthorized practice of law”
(UPL) generally prohibit nonlawyers from giving “legal advice.”
Legal advice includes interpreting the law for another person,1
expressing an opinion about what law applies to a person’s
situation,2 and recommending ways that a person might use the
law to obtain her objectives.3 However, these are the kinds of
† Associate Professor and Director, Legal and Ethical Studies program,
University of Baltimore Yale Gordon College of Arts and Sciences. A.B., The College of
William and Mary; Ph.D., Brandeis University; J.D., New York University School of
Law; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education. The author would like to thank
Professors Daniel Halberstam and Alan Morrison for their helpful comments on a
previous draft of this article.
1 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. RULESN.D.W.VA., LRPLP 9 (“legal advice . . . includes
offering interpretations of rules . . . or interpreting the meaning or effect of any Court Order
or judgment”); In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (“legal advice involves
the interpretation . . . of legal principles”); Unauthorized Practice of Law—Workmen’s
Compensation Commission—Nonlawyers May Not Represent Claimants at Commission
Hearings or Give Legal Advice on Matters Before It, 65 Op. Att’y. Gen. Md. 28, 33 (1980)
(“nonlawyer[s] may not . . . interpret legal documents”).
2 See, e.g., In re McDaniel, 232 B.R. 674, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.1999) (Legal
advice occurs where the nonlawyer “applies the statutes, rules, and information from
[legal] publications to the facts of the particular case.”); Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d
1345, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (Grant, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Legal
advice is often defined as giving an opinion as to the law applicable to the subject matter.”
(citing Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692–93 (Minn. 1980));
Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n., 561 A.2d 200, 208 (Md. 1989) (“advising clients by applying legal
principles to the client’s problem is practicing law”).
3 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. RULES N.D. W. VA., LR PL P 9 (“[L]egal
advice . . . includes . . . recommending a course of action.”); Meza-Sayas v. Conway, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66772, at *19 (D.C. Idaho Sept. 10, 2007) (“Legal advice includes the
choice of action to pursue, [and] the court in which to pursue it.”); Family Law—Domestic
Violence—Unauthorized Practice of Law—Activities of Advocates, 80 Op. Atty. Gen. Md.
138 (1995) (Nonlawyers “may not help [persons] decide, based upon the [persons’]
particular circumstances, whether to invoke any of their rights or pursue any of their
potential remedies.”); DEP’T OFDISPUTERESOLUTIONSERVS.OF THESUPREMECT.OFVA.,
GUIDELINES ON MEDIATION AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (n.d.), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/resources/upl_
guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SNG-YHK4] (Legal advice “directs, counsels, urges,
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speech—involving the expression of ideas, opinions, and
advocacy—that have generally been entitled to First Amendment
protection. Thus, it is not surprising that some commentators have
suggested that UPL restrictions interfere with the free speech
rights of nonlawyers and those who would hear such speech.4
Nonetheless, all the appellate courts that have
considered whether nonlawyers’ legal advice is speech protected
by the First Amendment have concluded that it is not.5 Such
unanimity might be presumed to resolve the issue, if these
appellate decisions were not scattershot in their approaches,
unconvincing in their reasoning, and inept at applying existing
First Amendment precedent. This article argues in Part I that
these appellate decisions, though espousing a wide range of
theories, present no convincing rationale for why nonlawyers’
legal advice is not protected speech. Further, as explained in
Part II, the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence indicates that
the UPL restrictions that exist in most states against
nonlawyers giving legal advice do violate the First Amendment.6
Although the failure of courts in this situation to police
an important constitutional right is reason enough for concern,
as discussed in Part III, this failure also presents the additional
disadvantage of undermining access to justice. Persons with civil
legal problems need guidance about how to enforce their legal
rights, but many of them cannot afford an attorney or obtain one
of the few available free ones. Unlike criminal defendants, the
or recommends a course of action by a disputant or disputants as a means of resolving a
legal issue.”).
4 See, e.g., Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2276 (1999) (“[I]t is not likely that rules prohibiting
nonlawyers from giving legal advice can survive constitutional scrutiny.”); Deborah L.
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (1981) (“Unauthorized
practice prohibitions plainly implicate first amendment values by restricting both lay
speakers’ ability to convey information and the public’s opportunities to receive it.”); see
also Catherine J. Lanctot, Does LegalZoom Have First Amendment Rights? Some
Thoughts about Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 257 (2011) (“[T]o the extent that these [UPL] statutes broadly
sweep vast amounts of law-related speech within their scope, they may infringe on free
speech rights.”) (focusing on First Amendment issues pertaining to nonlawyers drafting
legal documents).
5 See cases discussed infra Part I.
6 UPL restrictions could also be challenged as impermissibly burdening the
First Amendment right of petition. See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1192
(per curiam) (Fla. 1978) (“Once a person has made the decision to represent himself, we
should not enforce any unnecessary regulation which might tend to hinder the exercise
of this constitutionally protected right”), or in some circumstances as an interference
with the First Amendment right of association. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1962) (protecting nonlawyers’ solicitation
of clients for impact litigation as a form of “political expression and association”). This
article focuses specifically on the free speech clause.
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litigants in civil cases are not entitled to counsel. While the ideal
solution would be to ensure that all can have attorneys, in civil
as well as criminal cases, that ideal is very far from being
realized and would be expensive. If courts enforced the First
Amendment in this situation, it would offer a much less costly
and easier-to-scale-up remedy by permitting trained and
knowledgeable nonlawyers to give legal advice in appropriate
situations in civil legal cases where litigants must presently go
it alone. Such a result would not come without risks, because the
legal advice of nonlawyers will generally fall below the quality
of advice from lawyers. In Part III, this article describes how to
address the risks while still enforcing the Constitution and
improving access to justice.
I. THE PROBLEMATIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Varied rationales have been advanced by appellate courts
to justify the conclusion that nonlawyers’ legal advice is not
protected by the First Amendment. One theory is that such
advice amounts to “conduct,” not “speech,” and so can be
prohibited without raising First Amendment concerns.7 A
related theory considers legal advice to be speech but supposes
that because it is speech that is “incidental” to professional
conduct, it can be prohibited without running afoul of the First
Amendment.8 Another idea supposes that the broad authority of
the state to regulate the practice of law entitles it to such
deference that UPL restrictions against nonlawyers giving legal
advice need only have a rational basis in order to be upheld.9
And, finally, there is the idea that because nonlawyers’ legal
advice occurs in the context of a private interaction and involves
matters of private rather than public concern, it does not fall
within the type of speech protected by the First Amendment.10
While the courts that have considered the issue may agree that
there is no First Amendment violation, their explanations for
why not are so varied and inconsistent with each other as to cast
doubt on the validity of this collective conclusion. Further, their
rationales employ faulty reasoning and misapply and
misrepresent applicable precedent, and thus do not provide
convincing support for the view that nonlawyers’ legal advice
can be constitutionally suppressed and punished.
7 See infra Section I.A.
8 See infra Section I.B.
9 See infra Section I.C.
10 See infra Section I.D.
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A. Nonlawyers’ Legal Advice is Speech, not Conduct
One of the most prominent arguments made against
First Amendment protection for nonlawyers’ legal advice is that
such advice is conduct rather than speech, and therefore not
covered by the First Amendment. For example, in People v.
Shell, the Supreme Court of Colorado rejected a nonlawyer’s
First Amendment defense against UPL charges, reasoning that
the state’s “ban on the unauthorized practice of law does not
implicate the First Amendment because it is directed at conduct,
not speech.”11 Such a position has been taken fairly often by
courts and commentators.12 However, the court in Shell not only
forbade the defendant from representing parties in legal
proceedings or preparing legal documents, activities that may
conceivably be described as conduct, but also from offering
individuals legal advice,13 which would not appear to be conduct.
In support of its conclusion that the defendant’s various
activities, including the giving of legal advice, amounted to
conduct, the Colorado court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.14 However,
Ohralik deals with “commercial speech.”15 Commercial speech
does not encompass all speech emanating from a commercial
entity or that occurs in the context of for-profit activities.16 It has
been defined by the Court more specifically as “speech that
11 People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 173 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (emphasis in
original), cert. denied, Shell v. Colo., 550 U.S. 971 (2007) (nonlawyer advised parents in
child abuse and neglect proceedings, drafted pleadings for parents in such cases, and
attempted to represent parents in proceedings).
12 See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 646 (2011) (“Attorney advice largely has been ignored by the
legal academy, at least in part, because advice is viewed as conduct—not speech . . . .”);
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1277, 1284 (2005) (“[T]he ‘speech as conduct’ argument is sometimes made to explain
some of the uncharted zones of First Amendment law[ ] . . . such as . . . professional
advice to clients.”); see also Rhode, supra note 4, at 63 (“[T]he infrequency with which
lower courts have considered the first amendment dimensions of lay activity suggests
some implicit tendency to categorize it as conduct rather than expression.”).
13 “[T]he evidence in the record sufficiently supports the hearing master’s
findings that Shell offered legal advice, drafted legal pleadings and attempted to
represent another person in a judicial proceeding, all of which constitute the practice of
law.” Shell, 148 P.3d at 170 (emphasis added). Colorado statutory law specifically
prohibits “giving advice with respect to the law.” Id. at 171 (quoting C.R.C.P.
201.3(2)(b)(i) & (ii) (repealed 2014)).
14 Shell, 148 P.3d at 173 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978)).
15 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454.
16 The Court has also pointed out that “[s]ome of our most valued forms of fully
protected speech are uttered for a profit.” Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); N.Y. Times, Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
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proposes a commercial transaction.”17 The giving of legal advice
is not the proposal of a commercial transaction, and so should
not be governed by a precedent that applies to commercial
speech. The Supreme Court has in fact emphasized that for-
profit speech should not be conflated with commercial speech in
deciding First Amendment challenges and that what constitutes
commercial speech is actually quite limited.18 Further, the
Supreme Court even made clear in Ohralik that its holding in the
case was not intended to cover legal advice as such.19 Accordingly,
Ohralik does not govern the nonlawyer’s legal advice in Shell.
Further, the Colorado court in Shell misdescribes
Ohralik as “suggesting that the government’s regulation of the
practice of law is a regulation of conduct, not speech.”20 The court
did not cite any particular language fromOhralik to support this
conclusion.21 The closest Ohralik comes to “suggesting” such a
thing is where the Supreme Court says that “it has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.”22 But that statement makes the
unremarkable point that First Amendment protection is not
triggered simply because speech is an element of conduct that
may be legitimately regulated by the state. The conduct the
Supreme Court was referring to in Ohralik was the financial
transaction between lawyer and client and the speech initiating
it.23 The speech facilitating a transaction is truly instrumental
to the transaction, perhaps more analogous to the writing of
numbers on a check than to the expression of ideas. A
nonlawyer’s legal advice, on the other hand, does not resemble
such a transactional use of speech that could reasonably be
equated to conduct.
17 Fox, 492 U.S. at 482 (1989) (emphasis in original) (citing Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)); see also
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)
(defining commercial speech as an “expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience”).
18 Fox, 492 U.S. at 484–85.
19 The Court specifically noted that the disciplinary rule it was evaluating
“[did] not prohibit a lawyer from giving unsolicited legal advice; it proscribe[d] the
acceptance of employment resulting from such advice.” Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458.
20 People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 173 (Colo. 2006) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
456), cert. denied, Shell v. Colo., 550 U.S. 971 (2007).
21 Id.
22 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
23 Id. at 457.
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Although the Supreme Court did find that the state could
prohibit the in-person solicitation of legal business that had
occurred in Ohralik, the Court still concluded that speech was
sufficiently involved that the First Amendment was at least
implicated. The Court reasoned that even where speech is a
“subordinate component” of an activity that is mostly conduct,
that “does not remove the speech from the protection of the First
Amendment” though “it lowers the level of appropriate judicial
scrutiny.”24 Thus, even the transactional speech in Ohralik was
subject to some degree of First Amendment consideration,
rather than simply regarded as conduct exempt from scrutiny,
as the court in Shell seemed to believe.
The Supreme Court of Colorado’s distortion of Ohralik
led it to problematic reasoning with regard to the speech-conduct
distinction. In Shell, the court remarked:
[O]ur ban on the unauthorized practice of law is no different from
state laws prohibiting bribery, extortion, or criminal solicitation. Each
of these unlawful activities requires some method of communication,
and yet it is “well established that speech which, in its effect, is
tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may
itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally
to the constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”25
This comparison is fundamentally flawed. Extortion, bribery,
and criminal solicitation all use speech to bring about an end
that is itself illegal, whether to extract money against another
person’s will, to cause a public official to betray the public trust,
or to induce another to commit a criminal act. By contrast, giving
legal advice involves no “legitimately proscribable nonexpressive
conduct.”26 It is speech directed at the achievement of objectives
within the legal system, rather than aimed at violating the law.
Speech used to further the commission of a crime is not an apt
analogy to a nonlawyer’s legal advice and so does not provide
support for the Colorado court’s reasoning.
Even if the giving of legal advice by nonlawyers could
reasonably be called conduct, it would still be expressive conduct,
necessitating application of the First Amendment. A version of
the “conduct not, speech” argument was asserted by the
government in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in support
of a federal law prohibiting persons from giving material aid to
24 Id.
25 Shell, 148 P.3d at 173 (citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. Paladin Enter.,
Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)).
26 Id.
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terrorists, including aid in the form of legal advice.27 The
government argued that “the only thing truly at issue . . . is
conduct, not speech.”28 The Supreme Court pointed out that even
if the true objective was to regulate conduct, that did not matter
if the conduct was nonetheless “related to expression” and if the
target of the government regulation was communication
accomplished by means of the conduct.29 The highest level of
First Amendment scrutiny was therefore still required for
conduct that was expressive.30 This level of scrutiny would apply
to legal advice—if such advice could even be called conduct.
In addition, the Supreme Court has treated legal advice
as constituting speech rather than conduct. For example, in
Shaw v. Murphy, the Court declined, because of prison security
concerns, to expand the limited First Amendment rights of
prisoners to include the right to use written correspondence to
provide legal advice to other prisoners.31 (The Court had
previously concluded that the state could not use UPL
restrictions to prevent prisoners from providing each other with
legal advice in pursuing their habeas corpus petitions.32) In
Shaw, the Court applied a First Amendment analysis, rather
than simply proceeding on the assumption that prisoner
correspondence that conveyed legal advice constituted conduct
rather than speech and therefore was not covered by the First
Amendment.33 There is no Supreme Court precedent exempting
legal advice from constitutional protection on the grounds that
it is conduct.
The Colorado court’s Shell decision does not make a
compelling case for the idea that nonlawyers’ legal advice
amounts to conduct and thus is not protected by the First
Amendment. Further, Ohralik, the First Amendment precedent
upon which the court primarily relied,34 is not actually applicable
to noncommercial speech, and would not in any event justify
treating nonlawyers’ legal advice as conduct exempt from First
Amendment analysis.
27 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 1, 26–28 (2010). For
further discussion, see infra Section II.B.
28 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26.
29 Id. at 28 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
30 Id. For further discussion ofHumanitarian Law Project infra, see Section II.B.
31 Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001).
32 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 484–490 (1969). For further discussion, see
infra Section II.A.
33 Shaw, 532 U.S. 223.
34 People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 173 (Colo. 2006), cert. denied, Shell v. Colo.,
550 U.S. 971 (2007).
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B. Legal Advice is not Speech “Incidental” to Conduct
Justice Byron R. White’s concurring opinion in Lowe v.
Securities and Exchange Commission presents a more
persuasive variation on the speech-conduct distinction.35 Justice
White proposed that “the professional’s speech is incidental to
the conduct of the profession,” and that “legitimate regulation of
professional practice” therefore has an “only incidental impact
on speech.”36 In other words, if the practice of law is understood
to be conduct, then the practitioner’s speech ought to be regarded
as concomitant with such conduct, and therefore as not
triggering First Amendment speech protections.37
Although Justice White was not in the majority in Lowe,38
his concurrence has been influential, echoed by two appellate
courts in rejecting First Amendment challenges to UPL
restrictions against nonlawyers giving legal advice. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota in State v. Niska rejected the
idea that UPL restrictions violated First Amendment speech
rights, using White’s theory, because “any resulting limitation
on speech is merely incidental and is not directed at suppressing
the expression of ideas.”39 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit court
reasoned in Lawline v. American Bar Association, another case
involving the issue, that “[a]ny abridgment of the right to free
speech is merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise
legitimate regulation.”40
Although echoing Justice White’s conceptualization,
neither of these courts offered viable precedent for their rulings.
35 See, Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 211–236 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
36 Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
37 Nonlawyers would not strictly be covered by such an argument. There are
important differences in how lawyers and nonlawyers would be evaluated under the First
Amendment, some of which are discussed infra. For a somewhat different but analogous
perspective, see Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 844–49 (1999).
38 Robert Kry has argued that Justice White’s position was inconsistent with
previous Supreme Court precedent. Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional
Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 885, 895–96 (2000). For
further discussion, see infra, notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
39 State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d. 646, 649 (1986) (citations omitted). Niska was
sanctioned for a number of activities including the giving of legal advice. Id. at 648
(nonlawyer advised a person in three civil cases and one criminal case, and also drafted
pleadings on that person’s behalf). The court stated that “[a]lthough what constitutes
the practice of law does not lend itself to an inclusive definition, it clearly includes
Niska’s drafting of legal instruments and pleadings and providing legal advice.” Id. at
648 (emphasis added).
40 Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n., 956 F.2d 1378, 1381 (1992) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (nonlawyers—along with lawyers—assisted persons
who called hotline by answering legal questions). For example, “non-lawyers at Lawline
were giving legal advice to debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. at 1382.
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In Niska, the Supreme Court of North Dakota cited no fewer
than six Supreme Court cases as supporting its holding, none of
which are actually relevant to a content-based restriction on
speech. Five of the cases cited involved “time, place, and
manner” restrictions applicable to access to public forums.41 UPL
restrictions that prohibit nonlawyers from giving legal advice
are not time, place, and manner restrictions, as the speaker and
type of speech are being restricted, not the time, place, and
manner of the speech. The Supreme Court has consistently
stated that the time, place, and manner analysis is not
permitted for content-based restrictions,42 like those involving
nonlawyers’ legal advice.43
To support its holding, the Niska court also cited United
States v. O’Brien, in which a defendant burned his draft card in
protest of the Vietnam War.44 It is true that the Supreme Court
used language in O’Brien about permissible “incidental” effects.45
The Court explained that where “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.”46 However, UPL restrictions against
nonlawyers’ legal advice regulate speech as such, rather than
indirectly impacting communication accomplished by inference
from a behavior with which it is inseparably combined, as in
O’Brien. In citing O’Brien, the North Dakota court is not
comparing apples and apples.
O’Brien, by its own terms, would not apply to this
situation. According to O’Brien, when the government’s
41 Niska, 380 N.W.2d at 649 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984) (permit for demonstrations on public land); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (demonstration in front of public school); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (march on city hall; opinion summarized by court as
showing that “reasonable time, place and manner restrictions [are] valid even though
they limit expression.”)). The court also cited several other related cases. See United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (trespass onto military base), and Members of
City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (posting of
campaign signs on public property), which also involve time, place, and manner
restrictions applying to public forums. Id. For discussion of time, place, and manner
restrictions, see infra Section I.C.
42 See Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530,
536 (1980) (“time, place, or manner” analysis inapplicable where speech is regulated on
the basis of content); see also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 879–80
(1997) (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 536) (same).
43 For a discussion on the prohibition against nonlawyers’ legal advice as a
content-based restriction, see infra Section II.B.
44 Niska, 380 N.W.2d at 649 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968)); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
45 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
46 Id.
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“regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent
standard . . . for regulations of noncommunicative conduct
controls.”47 On the other hand, if the regulation is related to
expression, “then [it is] outside of O’Brien’s test,” therefore
requiring the application of “a more demanding standard.”48 The
permission supplied in O’Brien for the incidental regulation of
conduct applies to “noncommunicative conduct,” but nonlawyers’
legal advice is neither “noncommunicative” nor “conduct.”49
Further, the regulation in question is related to speech, and thus
appears to be outside of the more lenient standard that applies
to regulation that only incidentally reaches communication. In
short, none of the Supreme Court cases cited by the Supreme
Court of North Dakota in Niska as justification, including
O’Brien, are actually relevant to the constitutionality of
proscribing nonlawyers’ legal advice.
On the other hand, in Lawline, the Seventh Circuit
justified its position regarding “incidental” regulation by citing
Ohralik.50 However, Ohralik was a case about commercial
speech, and nonlawyers’ legal advice is not commercial speech
as the Supreme Court has defined it.51 Even Justice White did
not cite to Ohralik to support his “incidental” speech theory,
presumably because he did not think that case applicable.
Further, what Ohralik actually said is different from the
proposition for which the Seventh Circuit cites it. Ohralik itself
does not use any language about the “incidental” restriction of
speech. The language upon which the Seventh Circuit court
evidently relies52 remarks that “[a] lawyer’s procurement of
remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected
with First Amendment concerns.”53 The Supreme Court thus
indicated that it was not particularly concerned about the
47 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
48 Id. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
49 For a detailed discussion of this case, see generally Lanctot, supra note 4;
see also Kry, supra note 38, at 890 (“Many courts uphold restrictions on professional
speech by asserting that the speech is merely incidental to the conduct of the profession.
However, this reasoning cannot be squared with the Court’s normal approach to
expressive conduct cases.”) (footnote omitted). Kry’s discussion argues that O’Brien is
not supportive of this approach. Id. at 891–85.
50 Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n., 956 F.2d 1378, 1386 (1992) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459, 467–68 (1978)).
51 See discussion supra Section I.A.
52 The court cites pages 459 and 467–68 of Ohralik. Lawline, 956 F.2d at 1386
(citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459, 467–68). The latter citation refers to pages that discuss
the importance of the state being able to regulate members of the bar and some facts
particular to the Ohralik case, the relevance of which are unclear. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
467–68. The former page citation discusses the law, the most relevant-seeming part of
which is quoted here. Id. at 459.
53 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459.
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regulation of speech in Ohralik because the impact on speech
was very limited, not that it was unconcerned because the
regulation of speech occurred as an incident to “otherwise
legitimate regulation.”54 Amarginal regulation is one that hardly
affects speech, and so does not raise substantial First Amendment
concerns. The regulation of a financial transaction accomplished
by means of words indeed has only marginal impact on free
speech. On the other hand, an incidental regulation is not
targeted at speech—and so might be an acceptable regulation—
but could still be subjected to the highest level of scrutiny if it has
a more than marginal impact on speech. The Seventh Circuit is
missing the significant difference between the meanings of
“marginal” and “incidental” in citing what it sees as support
from Ohralik.
In fact, a regulation banning speech as an incident to
achieving some desirable state interest is not likely to be
approved by the Supreme Court unless the speech reached by
that regulation is truly marginal in nature. On the same day it
decided Ohralik, the Supreme Court also decided In re Primus,
a case that also involved an act of client solicitation and in which
much the same interests in regulation were articulated by the
state.55 However, because the client solicitation in In re Primus
was not specifically directed at instigating a financial
transaction (i.e., was not about a behavior the state could
regulate), the Supreme Court applied the highest level of First
Amendment scrutiny to the regulation.56 The solicitation of
clients in that case was directed at finding plaintiffs for civil
rights litigation.57 The regulation indeed only incidentally
reached speech, as the purpose of the regulation was to protect
consumers from the harm resulting from in-person business
solicitation.58 But its impact on free speech and association was
more than marginal and was accordingly not permitted.59
Ohralik, especially considered in light of Primus, does not
54 See Lawline, 956 F.2d at 1381 (“Any abridgement of the right to free speech
is merely the incident of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation.”).
55 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414–20 (1976). The state’s regulation was “aimed
at the prevention of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of
privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other evils that are thought to inhere
generally in solicitation by lawyers of prospective clients.” Id. at 432.
56 Id. (the state’s action must withstand the “exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights.” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–
45 (1976))).
57 Id. at 422.
58 Id. at 432 (the purpose of the rules was to prevent “undue influence, overreaching,
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other evils that
are thought to inhere generally, in solicitation by lawyers of prospective clients”).
59 Id. at 433 (“The Disciplinary Rules in question sweep broadly.”).
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support the Seventh Circuit’s theory in Lawline that an
incidental regulation of speech is subject to anything less than
the highest scrutiny.
Justice White’s theory about incidental speech in Lowe
has substantial shortcomings that are elided by Niska and
Lawline. In support of his theory, Justice White mainly offered
an analogy: “Just as offer and acceptance are communications
incidental to the regulable transaction called a contract, the
professional’s speech is incidental to the conduct of the
profession.”60 This analogy, while more apt than the bribery-
extortion comparison offered by the Supreme Court of Colorado
in Shell,61 still does not work to justify regulation of nonlawyers’
legal advice. For one thing, the speech that constitutes a contract
serves to (and is intended to serve to) instantiate a legally-
mediated transaction. When a state determines what promises
can and cannot be made between contracting parties, those are
regulations directed at conduct, even if enforced against
descriptions in words of the conduct at issue. (If a contract were
not legally binding and giving rise to particular regulable
behaviors, the state would have no interest in its words.)
Further, a contract does not really, in any event, involve a
lawyer’s speech; in drafting the contract, the lawyer is not
expressing her own views and opinions but selecting language
that accomplishes (and expresses) the client’s objectives. Thus,
the impact of any regulation on the professional’s speech in such
a situation, where the professional is merely channeling the
client’s objectives, would in fact be marginal.
Legal advice, by contrast, is speech that is not
transactional in nature, and it is very much in the vein of speech
that has traditionally been protected by the First Amendment.62
For example, a criminal defense attorney in consultation with a
client might critically evaluate the state of the law with respect
to the client’s situation, recommend a particular legal strategy
(even, perhaps, a controversial one), opine about how certain
evidence in the case will be evaluated by the judge, and work
through scenarios addressing various possible legal outcomes.
Such legal advice is truly the attorney’s speech, not merely a
60 Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
61 See discussion supra Section I.A.
62 See Halberstam, supra note 37, 840–41 (“[A]lthough a professional might be
viewed as engaged in the transaction of selling his professional advice, one must, of
course, distinguish between the offer of professional services, which is akin to a
commercial proposal, and the actual presentation of the professional advice, which is no
more a ‘commercial transaction’ than is the actual writing or reading of a book or
newspaper that is available for sale.” (footnote omitted)).
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“channeling” of client objectives in the manner of contractual
draftwork. Justice White’s analogy therefore relies upon a
similarity between contracts and professional speech that does
not hold up, insofar as the giving of legal advice is concerned.
Another problem with Justice White’s theory is that it
would by extension enable the state to label almost any speech
as incidental to some conduct and therefore subject to regulation.
Thus, the state might classify journalism and community
organizing as professions, and then enact regulations limiting
writing for a newspaper or speaking at a community meeting to
those it licensed, as involving speech incidental to the carrying
out of such professions. But in Thomas v. Collins, the U.S.
Supreme Court specifically disapproved this kind of end-run
around the First Amendment.63 Thomas involved a First
Amendment challenge by a person prosecuted for advocating that
employees join a union, without his having first registered as a
union organizer as required by state law.64 The state argued that
First Amendment considerations were “wholly inapplicable” to its
regulation of such “business or economic activity.”65 Agreeing, the
Supreme Court of Texas sustained the regulation as a valid
exercise of the state’s police power, undertaken “‘for the protection
of the general welfare of the public, and particularly the laboring
class,’ with special reference to safeguarding laborers from
imposture when approached by an alleged organizer.”66 However,
the Supreme Court concluded that the state could not use the
registration requirement as a means of interfering with speech—
even if the state could regulate conduct associated with union
organizing, such as the solicitation of payments to the union.67
In other words, the Supreme Court did not accept the idea that
the state could avoid the application of the First Amendment by
imposing a registration requirement on speech and then treating
the violation of that requirement as involving conduct and not
speech. Similarly, making the giving of legal advice conditional
upon obtaining a license to practice law does not transform the
giving of legal advice without a license into speech incidental to
conduct that the state can then proscribe.68
63 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539–43 (1945); see also Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 150 (2002) (ordinance
requiring registration and permit for door-to-door advocacy is unconstitutional).
64 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 516.
65 Id. at 531.
66 Id. at 524 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Ex parte Thomas, 174 S.W.2d
958 (Tex. 1943)).
67 Id. at 536–37.
68 See Kry, supra note 38, at 889 (“When professional advice-rendering
activities are covered by a system of licensure, particularly acute First Amendment
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In all fairness, Justice White did recognize this potential
problem with his theory. He remarked: “Surely it cannot be said,
for example, that if Congress were to . . . establish a licensing
scheme under which ‘unqualified’ writers were forbidden to
publish, this Court would be powerless to hold that the legislation
violated the First Amendment.”69 However, he believed he had
solved this problem by “locat[ing] the point where regulation of a
profession leaves off and prohibitions on speech begin,”70 which
he identified as where the attorney-client relationship or its
equivalent is created.71 Accordingly,
[w]here the personal nexus between professional and client does not
exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on
behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is
directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as
legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental
impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as
such, subject to the First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”72
White supposed that all speech involved in the practice of law
might reasonably be subsumed under the rubric of professional
conduct, wherever the professional relationship as described has
been established.
But what is the constitutional basis for Justice White’s
“personal nexus” distinction? It is not located in the First
Amendment. Rather, states define what is professional conduct.
It is a fly in Justice White’s ointment that some states have
defined the practice of law more broadly to include legal advice
not only to particular individuals but also that occurring through
speaking or publishing to a general audience, which Justice
White indicated is protected by the First Amendment.73 A state
might even in theory go even further and decide that any and all
questions arise because the license requirement arguably acts as a prior restraint on
speech . . . As the Supreme Court explains, ‘Prior restraints on speech and publication
are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.’ This
view reflects the First Amendment’s historical motivation: British laws that had sought
to impose licensing requirements on the press.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Neb. Press
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976))).
69 Lowe v. Sec.&Exch.Comm’n, 472U.S. 181, at 231 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 232.
71 Id.
72 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 720 (1931)).
73 See, e.g., Shortz v. Yetter, 38 Pa. D. & C. 291, 299 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Luzerne Cty.
1940) (finding that UPL restrictions against nonlawyers giving legal advice allows for
banning self-help book written for general public); see also Palmer v. Unauthorized
Practice Comm. of State Bar of Tex., 438 S.W.2d 374, 375, 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)
(same). Other states have at least flirted with the idea of adopting such a broader
definition. See infra note 103.
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authoritative speaking and publishing about the law amounts to
the practice of law, and thereby suppress such speech, except
where engaged in by the licensed professional. Justice White
seemed to assume that there is an a priori or ur- definition of the
practice of law, when in fact there is no touchstone by which
speech can be dispositively identified as falling or not falling
under the rubric of professional conduct. Rather than starting
from an idea about what constitutes the practice of law and
basing the First Amendment analysis on that perceived
definition, the right approach would instead seem to be the
opposite: what the First Amendment considers to be speech
determines the scope of what the state can regulate as
professional conduct.
Even if it could be said that professional speech is
integral to professional conduct and can be regulated because of
the close association of the speech with professional conduct,
that same logic does not apply to speech from a nonprofessional
that merely overlaps or resembles the speech of a professional.
In such situations, there is no “professional nexus” of the kind
described by Justice White. Insofar as a nonlawyer’s giving of
legal advice is not actually incidental to the practice of law, it
would not seem to be covered by White’s theory.
It should be noted that Justice White’s formulation
constrains lawyers as well as nonlawyers. It would enable a
state to limit the legal advice that lawyers give their clients, for
example, to forbid lawyers from telling clients about favorable
law or legal strategies, as such speech would be “incidental” to
the conduct of the practice of law and thus its regulation would
not be subject to the First Amendment. Indeed, in Legal Services
Corporation v. Velazquez, the plaintiff challenged an attempt by
Congress to limit the kinds of cases that lawyers receiving funds
from the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) could handle, the
advice they could give to clients, and the arguments that LSC-
funded lawyers could present on behalf of their clients in legal
proceedings.74 The Supreme Court rejected the idea that the
government could “[r]estrict[ ] LSC attorneys in advising their
clients”75 and prevent them from being able to give those clients
“full advice.”76 Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Went for It, the Supreme
Court remarked: “Speech by professionals obviously has many
dimensions. There are circumstances in which we will accord
74 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538–39 (2001) (“Under LSC’s
interpretation, however, grantees could not accept representations designed to change welfare
laws, much less argue against the constitutionality or statutory validity of those laws.”).
75 Id. at 544.
76 Id. at 546.
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speech by attorneys on . . . matters of legal representation the
strongest protection our Constitution has to offer.”77 Justice
White’s theory would essentially withdraw from lawyers any
right to have their legal advice protected by the First
Amendment when it is professionally offered—a view which as
these cases evidence is not generally endorsed by the Court.
Justice White’s idea about “incidental” permissible
regulation, which influenced the courts in Niska and Lawline,
has no support in Supreme Court jurisprudence or in logic. On
the contrary, Thomas and Ohralik both suggest that the First
Amendment is more likely to distinguish speech from associated
professional conduct in order to safeguard the speech, rather
than to conflate speech with professional conduct in order to
restrict it.
C. Legal Advice is not Subject to a Rational Basis Test on
the Theory That States Have Broad Authority over the
Practice of Law
The state’s broad power to regulate the practice of law
has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court.78 The sense that
states have exceedingly or exceptionally broad power in this
regard has sometimes been seen by state courts as meaning that
UPL restrictions are entitled to special deference, even to the
point of lowering the scrutiny that applies to First Amendment
challenges. That seems to be the theory, in any event, behind the
decision in Montana Supreme Court Commission on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law v. O’Neil, in which the Supreme
Court of Montana concluded that the state’s prohibition against
the activities of a nonlawyer, including his giving of legal advice,
only had to be rationally justified in order to be upheld under the
First Amendment.79
77 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995) (citations omitted).
78 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (citations
omitted) (“We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public
health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards
for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. . . . The interest of
the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the
primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been
‘officers of the courts.’”).
79 Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on the Unauthorized Practice of Law v.
O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200 (Mont. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1282 (2007). In appealing a
permanent injunction against him for UPL, O’Neil claimed a violation of his “First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech, expression, association, petition and privacy.”
Id. at 214. O’Neil had advertised his services as an “independent paralegal.” Id. at 204.
He was accused of attempting to “represent” a party to a divorce, giving “legal advice”
and negotiating on behalf of the ex-wife of a person under the guardianship of Adult
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In reaching its conclusion, the Montana court relied in
part on a Ninth Circuit case that rejected a First Amendment
challenge to California’s decision to limit an indigent defense
panel to members of its own bar.80 But the out-of-state lawyers
in that Ninth Circuit case had a much weaker First Amendment
claim with regard to in-court representation than the nonlawyer
in O’Neil did with regard to the legal advice he dispensed.
California’s strong interest in husbanding a scarce resource paid
for by taxpayer dollars permitted it to put “time, place, and
manner restrictions” on speech in the courtroom81 so long as such
restrictions did not prevent the parties (the ones with speech
rights in the courtroom) from exercising their rights.82 By
contrast, O’Neil, when giving legal advice, was not imposing
upon a publicly-funded tribunal and its interest in conserving
taxpayer resources. Further, he was not serving as an
intermediary between a party and a court, but rather
communicating his own opinions and ideas to another person,
directly implicating his own free speech rights. His listener’s
First Amendment rights were also implicated to the extent she
wished to hear his legal advice. The Ninth Circuit decision
involved materially different facts and issues, and so the
Montana court’s reliance on it as precedent was improper in
evaluating the legal advice given by the nonlawyer in O’Neil.83
Protective Services, and preparing materials for divorce proceedings. Id. The Supreme
Court of Montana made clear that it was upholding the permanent injunction against
O’Neil not simply for preparing pleadings and attempting to appear in court but also for
the giving of legal advice, as “[t]his Court has long defined the practice of law to include
legal services whose product touches legal matters not immediately at issue in court.”
Id. at 215. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that the lower court’s
finding that O’Neil’s “conduct of drafting pleadings for his customers, providing them
with legal advice and appearing in court with his customers” could be constitutionally
prohibited was “unquestionably” correct. Id. (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 214 (citing Russell v. Hug, 275 F.3d 812, 823 (9th Cir. 2002)).
81 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18
(1980) (“Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the free flow
of traffic, see, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), so may a trial judge, in
the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access
to a trial.”); see also Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 127 (2011)
(legislative session may limit participants with time, place, and manner restrictions).
82 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (Time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible
“provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”).
83 Accord Hackin v. State, 427 P.2d 910, 910–12 (Ariz. 1967) (en banc) (per
curiam) (affirming conviction and rejecting First Amendment free speech challenge of
nonlawyer for UPL for appearing in state habeas proceeding on behalf of indigent
prisoner convicted of murder who had been unable to obtain attorney), appeal dismissed,
389 U.S. 143 (1967).
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The Ninth Circuit had described the out-of-state lawyers
challenging California’s rule as operating on the mistaken
theory that “an individual has a First Amendment right to
practice law in any way of his choosing, free even of rationally-
based regulation.”84 That challenge had to fail, the Ninth Circuit
concluded, because such a “broadly formulated First Amendment
argument . . . would[ ] . . . greatly undermine the power of states
to regulate bar membership, when this power has been
repeatedly recognized and upheld by the courts.”85 The Montana
court used this same theory and language to justify its denial of
O’Neil’s First Amendment claim.86 But concluding that
nonlawyers are constitutionally entitled to give legal advice would
not turn them into members of the bar and so would not intrude
upon the state’s power to regulate bar membership. Moreover, if
in fact the First Amendment protects nonlawyers’ legal advice,
then it would not be the case that state authority over the bar was
being undermined but rather that the proper scope of the state’s
authority under the Constitution was being recognized. In other
words, the First Amendment is superior to professional
regulation, rather than being the tail that wags the dog.
In addition to the Ninth Circuit case, the Supreme Court
of Montana also cited Ohralik as justification for denying
O’Neil’s First Amendment claim, remarking that “[t]he United
States Supreme Court has responded to this question by holding
that regulation of the bar ‘is a subject only marginally affected
with First Amendment concerns.’”87But inOhralik, the Supreme
Court did not actually say that. It said that “[a] lawyer’s
procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only
marginally affected with First Amendment concerns.”88 The former
is of course a great deal more sweeping a claim than the latter. The
state’s prohibition of O’Neil from giving legal advice was not a
regulation of a “procurement of remunerative employment,” as in
Ohralik.89 And the Supreme Court would not even say that
regulation of the bar is only marginally affected with First
Amendment concerns, as that would hardly be consistent with the
various cases in which the Court has found that a state’s regulation
of the bar violated the First Amendment.90
84 Russell, 275 F.3d at 822 (citation omitted).
85 Id.
86 Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on the Unauthorized Practice of Law v.
O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 214 (Mont. 2006) (quoting Russell, 275 F.3d at 823).
87 Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978)).
88 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added).
89 Id. See discussion supra Section I.A.
90 See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (State bar violated First
Amendment by sanctioning attorney for soliciting client for the ACLU); United Mine
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The Montana court also justified its rejection of O’Neil’s
First Amendment claim by stating that “[t]he Supreme Court
has recognized a First Amendment right to receive legal advice,
but that right is limited to clients of duly qualified attorneys
consistent with ‘the State’s interest in high standards of legal
ethics,’” citing to United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Association.91 If one read the Montana court’s statement too
quickly, one might get the impression that the Supreme Court
has held that the right to receive legal advice “is limited to the
clients of duly qualified attorneys,” and might even suppose that
the United Mine Workers case says or at least suggests such a
thing.92 But it does not.
United Mine Workers does at least use the phrase quoted
by the Montana court: “the State’s interest in high standards of
legal ethics.”93 But it is used in a sentence in which the Supreme
Court concluded that a state regulation preventing a union from
hiring an attorney on a salaried basis to represent union
members’ interests “substantially impairs the associational
rights of [those members] and is not needed to protect the State’s
interest in high standards of legal ethics.”94 The Supreme Court
observed, “That the States have broad power to regulate the
practice of law is, of course, beyond question.”95 It added, “But it
is equally apparent that broad rules framed to protect the public
and to preserve respect for the administration of justice can in
their actual operation significantly impair the value of
associational freedoms.”96 The Court’s decision in United Mine
Workers does not indicate that the state’s broad authority and
interest in high standards of professional regulation lead to any
diminution of the application of the First Amendment.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates
that the rational basis test apparently employed by the Supreme
Court of Montana in O’Neil does not properly apply to First
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (State bar violated
First Amendment by preventing union from employing attorney to assist union
members); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431
(1962) (professional ethics rule prohibiting solicitation of clients asserting constitutional
rights violated First Amendment).
91 O’Neil, 147 P.3d at 214 (citing United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 225). Cf.
Janson v. LegalZoom.com, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1066 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (This case also
cites to United Mine Workers, stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized a First
Amendment right to receive legal advice from duly qualified attorneys, consistent with
‘the State’s interest in high standards of legal ethics.’” (citing United Mine Workers, 389
U.S. at 225)).
92 O’Neil, 334 P.3d at 214 (citing United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 225).
93 Id.
94 United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 218, 225.
95 Id. at 222.
96 Id.
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Amendment challenges at all.97 Even commercial speech,
according to the Supreme Court, is subject to a test that “is far
different, of course, from the ‘rational basis’ test used for
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis.”98 Under a
rational basis test, “it suffices if the law could be thought to
further a legitimate governmental goal, without reference to
whether it does so at inordinate cost.”99 But where commercial
speech is challenged under the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court “require[s] the government goal to be substantial, and the
cost to be carefully calculated.”100 In a situation involving legal
advice, as in O’Neil, the use of the rational basis test would be
an even greater misapplication, as the Supreme Court has
indicated that noncommercial speech is more protected under
the First Amendment than commercial speech that is
transactional in nature.101 In short, there is no First Amendment
theory recognized by the Supreme Court under which a rational
basis test would apply to a First Amendment challenge to a
regulation prohibiting nonlawyers from giving legal advice.
The idea that states’ broad authority over professions
means that they can prohibit nonlawyers’ legal advice whenever
such regulation is rationally-based is not only unsupported but
actually contradicted by First Amendment jurisprudence.
Accordingly, the Montana court’s rationale in O’Neil does not
provide a sound basis for concluding that nonlawyers’ legal
advice can be constitutionally prohibited.
D. Nonlawyers’ Legal Advice is not Exempt from First
Amendment Protection Because of its Private Context or
Private Significance
Commentators have suggested that legal advice that is
privately conveyed and for a recipient’s private use is not the
kind of speech that the First Amendment is intended to
97 Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480–81 (1989).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (“The
Central Hudson test is significantly stricter than the rational basis test, however,
requiring the Government not only to identify specifically ‘a substantial interest to be
achieved by [the] restriction on commercial speech,’ but also to prove that the regulation
‘directly advances’ that interest and is ‘not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564, 566 (1980))).
101 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)
(“[C]ommercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than
noncommercial speech.”). See discussion supra Section I.A.
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protect.102 Indeed, UPL restrictions often prohibit a nonlawyer
from giving legal advice to a particular individual, while
allowing the same legal advice if conveyed to the general
public.103 The Supreme Court of Michigan in State Bar v. Cramer
and the Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh
both focused on this distinction in ruling on nonlawyers’ First
Amendment claims.104And although JusticeWhite’s concurrence
in Lowe employed a similar distinction to establish the dividing
line between regulable professional speech and protected free
speech,105 his conceptualization can also be understood as
reflecting the idea that the privately-conveyed nature of
individual legal advice removes it from the public zone of speech
protected by the First Amendment.
InCramer, the nonlawyer defendant provided legal forms
and explanatory materials to the general public and also gave
specific legal advice to particular individuals through “personal
contact.”106 The Michigan court found that only the latter was
prohibited by state law,107 and described the distinction between
102 See Knake, supra note 12, at 645 (“most First Amendment doctrine
addresses speech intended for public consumption, while legal advice by definition
entails communication intended for private consumption by clients”). Id. at 646
(“[a]ttorney advice largely has been ignored by the legal academy, at least in
part, . . . because of its inherently private nature”).
103 See, e.g., Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, AM. B.
ASS’N Cmt. 1 (Sept. 18, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/task_force_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_definition.
html [https://perma.cc/TBD9-JF9V] (The comment observed that for “conduct to be
considered the practice of law, . . . [it] must be targeted toward the circumstances or
objectives of a specific person. Thus, courts have held that the publication of legal self-
help books is not the practice of law.”). See N. Y. Cty. Lawyer’s Ass’n v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d
161 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (“Order reversed and petition dismissed with costs on the
dissenting opinion at the Appellate Division.”), rev’d 21 N.Y.2d 694. InDacey, the opinion
observed that a nonlawyer’s book with forms and instructions intended for a general
audience did not involve the practice of law because
[t]here is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual, [nor]
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. This is the essential of legal practice—the representation
and the advising of a particular person in a particular situation.
Id. at 174. Compare Fla. Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1974) (“package forms”
provided by nonlawyer giving legal advice may be banned as UPL); Fla. Bar v Am. Legal
& Bus. Forms, 274 So. 2d 225, 226–27 (Fla. 1973) (same), with Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh,
355 So. 2d 1186, (per curiam) (Fla. 1978) at 1194 (nonlawyers “may sell printed material
purporting to explain legal practice and procedure to the public in general and . . . may
sell sample legal forms” and “[t]o this extent we limit our prior holdings in Stupica and
American Legal and Business Forms, Inc.”).
104 Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d at 1194; State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 5–7
(Mich. 1976) (per curiam).
105 See discussion supra Section I.B.
106 Cramer, 249 N.W.2d at 5, 8–9 (The nonlawyer in Cramer was accused of
“selling legal forms and providing advice and counsel necessary to obtaining a divorce.”).
107 Id. at 8–9.
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the two modes of conveyance as being “significant” to its ruling
in favor of First Amendment protection for such speech to the
general public but not to particular individuals.108 However, the
court did not explain why the distinction was significant,
specifically discuss the merits of Cramer’s First Amendment
defense,109 or cite any First Amendment precedent in its
opinion.110 Rather, the court mostly relied on a decision by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in a case with similar facts.111 However,
that Oregon case nevermentioned the First Amendment. Instead,
the Oregon court concluded that the legal advice provided to the
general public by the defendant did not fall under the state’s
definition of the practice of law, while the defendant’s
“consultation, explanation, recommendation or advice” to
individual persons did.112 In other words, the Oregon case Cramer
relied on was decided entirely on state law grounds based on the
state’s definition of the practice of law, and thus would not
illuminate the First Amendment claim raised in Cramer.
In Brumbaugh, the Supreme Court of Florida made a
distinction similar to that in Cramer in holding that the
defendant could “sell printed material purporting to explain
legal practice and procedure to the public in general” but could
not “engage in advising clients as to the various remedies
available to them, or otherwise assist them in preparing those
forms.”113 In ruling against the defendant’s First Amendment
claim, Brumbaugh discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, which it described as militating
against a paternalistic approach to speech and the suppression
of the free flow of information.114 But the Florida court did not
explain how it got from this constitutional principle to its
particular, seemingly contrary conclusion, nor did it explain how
it was using this precedent to support a constitutional
distinction between legal advice to the general public as opposed
to legal advice to individuals.
The Supreme Court has not in fact distinguished in its
First Amendment jurisprudence between speech conveyed to the
108 Id.
109 Id. at 6. (Cramer contended that “the [UPL] statute and injunctive order
deprive[d] her of her first amendment rights.”).
110 The Michigan court did observe that “where a statute does impinge on
constitutional rights, it must be ‘narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake,’” a proposition for which it cited Roe v. Wade. Id. at 8 (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
111 See id. (citing Or. State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. 1975)).
112 Gilchrist, 538 P.2d at 919.
113 Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (1978) (per curiam).
114 Id. at 1193 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361–62 (1977)).
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general public and speech conveyed privately to a particular
individual.115 For example, the Court has expressly stated that
where a public employee is terminated from employment in
response to speech she communicated to just one individual, that
does not lessen its First Amendment protection.116 This result is
115 However, one commentator has argued that the Supreme Court “went to
great pains” in Thomas v. Collins to distinguish between the organizer’s solicitation to
the employees as a group and his solicitation of one particular individual, Pat O’Sullivan.
Kry, supra note 38, at 898–99. Kry observes:
The Court never offered a compelling explanation as to why an invitation to
enlist in a union is a form of protected speech when delivered to many, but a
form of professional conduct when delivered to one. While it ultimately
declined to rule on the constitutional dimensions of the latter, it clearly felt
that there was a significant difference between the two. Was this because the
Court felt that the meaning of the speech itself depends on whether it is
delivered to a group of people or to a single person? Or was it because the
nature of the speaker-listener relationship is different in a fashion that
somehow affects the analysis? The Court did not attempt to answer these
questions.
Id. at 899 (footnote omitted). However, the Court does not actually make a distinction in
Thomas between speech delivered to many and speech delivered to one. The full passage
from Thomas to which Kry refers reads as follows:
Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which
amounts to more than the right of free discussion comprehends, as when he
undertakes the collection of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm
where a reasonable registration or identification requirement may be imposed.
In that context, such solicitation would be quite different from the solicitation
involved here. It would be free speech plus conduct akin to the activities which
were present, and which it was said the State might regulate, in Schneider v.
State, supra, and Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. That, however, must be done,
and the restriction applied, in such a manner as not to intrude upon the rights
of free speech and free assembly. In this case, the separation was not
maintained. If what Thomas did, in soliciting Pat O’Sullivan, was subject to
such a restriction, as to which we express no opinion, that act was intertwined
with the speech and the general invitation in the penalty which was imposed
for violating the restraining order. Since the penalty must be taken to have
rested as much on the speech and the general invitation as on the specific one,
and the former clearly were immune, the judgment cannot stand.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540–41 (1945). The distinction the Court makes is
between the financial transaction that can be regulated by the state (as “free speech plus
conduct”), where a “reasonable registration or identification requirement may be
imposed,” and free speech as such (whether to many or just Pat O’Sullivan) that cannot
be regulated. Id. at 540. Accordingly, the Court’s approach in Thomas is consistent with
its approach in Ohralik, and does not imply that lesser First Amendment protection
applies to speech directed at a single individual.
116 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1979) (This case
involved an alleged unconstitutional retaliation for a public employee’s speech. The
Court considered whether speech communicated privately was entitled to First
Amendment protection.). The Court’s conclusion was unequivocal:
The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the “freedom of speech.” Neither
the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the
public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer
rather than to spread his views before the public. We decline to adopt such a
view of the First Amendment.
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not surprising. Even when speech is “privately” communicated,
it has in a sense entered the public domain—it has been made
“public” to at least one other party—indeed, such would qualify
as a “publication” for a defamation suit.117
Further, the idea that the government is generally
allowed to regulate privately-conveyed speech is not something
the Supreme Court seems likely to endorse. In United States v.
Alvarez, a case involving a defendant who publicly lied about
receiving a military award and thereby violated a congressional
statute forbidding such false statements, the plurality expressed
concern that the statute would reach both “public and private
conversation,”118 that it “would apply with equal force to
personal, whispered conversations within a home.”119 Rather
than suggesting that lesser First Amendment protection applies
to privately-conveyed speech, the plurality implied that
regulation of such speech (even when conveying falsehoods)
would be particularly problematic because of its intrusiveness.
In any event, as the Court has pointed out, the First Amendment
forbids laws abridging the freedom of speech, without specifying
that the speech has to be conveyed in a public way before
receiving such protection.120 It is difficult to see how the Cramer
and Brumbaugh courts make the distinction that they do
between different forms of legal advice, given that the Supreme
Court has specifically rejected the idea that the size of the
audience for speech affects its First Amendment protection.
It is true that privately-conveyed speech may cause harm
that is harder to detect and address than does publicly-conveyed
speech. The Supreme Court justified the prophylactic rule in
Ohralik in part because in-person solicitation of clients by
lawyers occurs in an interaction that is “not visible or otherwise
open to public scrutiny.”121 The private character of that speech
made it “virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation
Id. at 415–16. The Court reaffirmed this perspective more recently in Garcetti v. Ceballos
(2006), again finding that the private nature of a communication does not determine whether
it is protected by the First Amendment. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“That
Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not dispositive.”).
117 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-3) (“A libel is published as soon as it is
communicated to any person other than the party libeled.”); Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So.2d
99, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (“Publication is sufficiently accomplished . . . by the
communication of the slander to only one person other than the person defamed.”
(citation omitted)); Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 217 N.E.2d 736, 739 (Mass. 1966)
(“It is enough [for libel] that it is communicated to a single individual other than the one
defamed.” (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 577 (AM. LAW INST. 1938))).
118 U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 712–13, 718 (2012) (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 722.
120 Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16 (the First Amendment itself does not indicate
freedom of speech is lost where speech is communicated to only one other person).
121 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978).
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by the State.”122 However, the state could proscribe the speech in
Ohralik not because it occurred in a private interaction but
because it was associated with a financial transaction that the
state could regulate.123 The fact that the speech occurred outside
of public scrutiny merely made the state’s grounds for regulation
of the speech associated with such conduct more persuasive.124
Indeed, in a similar case, In re Primus, the private nature of the
lawyer’s contact with his solicited client did not prevent the
Court from applying the highest level of First Amendment
scrutiny to the state’s regulation, as the speech in question did
not primarily consummate a financial transaction.125 It appears
that the fact that privately-conveyed speech may lead to harms
that are harder to detect and address does not reduce the
applicable First Amendment scrutiny, though it may count in
favor of the state’s interest in regulation. It should be noted,
moreover, that any analysis regarding privately-conveyed speech
should not begin by ruling out such speech from First Amendment
consideration, as the courts did in Cramer and Brumbaugh.
It is also true that whether speech is about matters of
concern to the general public, as opposed to matters of purely
private interest, sometimes affects First Amendment analysis.
The Supreme Court has indicated that greater First Amendment
protection applies to speech involving “matters of public
concern.”126 For example, where a public employee is terminated
122 Id.
123 Id. at 457.
124 After determining that the situation involved an “[i]n-person solicitation by
a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which speech is an
essential but subordinate component,” the Court concluded that it “does not remove the
speech from the protection of the First Amendment, . . . [though] it lowers the level of
appropriate judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 457. Given the lower level of scrutiny, state interests
were therefore relevant to the legitimacy of the regulation, and the Court went on to
consider those state interests. Id. at 460.
125 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 415–16, 428 (1978). The lawyer in Primus
contacted a potential client with a personal letter advising her of the possibility of
representation by the American Civil Liberties Union in a lawsuit. Id. at 415–17. The Court
distinguished between Ohralik and Primus based on the type of speech involved, not
whether the speech was privately or publicly conveyed: “The approach we adopt today in
Ohralik, . . . that the State may proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under
circumstances likely to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant’s
activity [in Primus].” Id. at 434. The Court in Primus required not merely the risk of harm
but actual harm to the potential client (“Although a showing of potential dangermay suffice
in the former context [in Ohralik], appellant may not be disciplined unless her activity in
fact involved the type of misconduct at which South Carolina’s broad prohibition is said to
be directed.”). Id. The Court did make the point that the kind of client contact engaged in
in Primus gave the state more ability to police abuses: “the fact that there was a written
communication lessens substantially the difficulty of policing solicitation practices that do
offend valid rules of professional conduct.” Id. at 435–36. But the privacy of the contact did
not lessen the level of scrutiny applying to the speech.
126 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (speech on matters
of public concern entitled to particular First Amendment protection); see also Connick v.
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for engaging in speech involving a matter of only personal
interest, the First Amendment is not violated, though it would
be a First Amendment violation if the termination was for
speech involving a matter of public concern.127 And a person
cannot usually be found liable for defamation where the speech
at issue involves a matter of public concern, though she can be
found liable for such speech that involves a matter of private
concern.128 However, the distinction between speech involving
matters of public and private concern seems to be used mainly
for the purpose of determining when the First Amendment can
be used as a sword or shield in disputes that are essentially
tortious in nature,129 and does not suggest that speech involving
matters of private concern is otherwise open to state regulation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that there is no
general basis for denying full First Amendment protection to
speech involving matters of private concern. The Court has
repeatedly made the point that the government cannot
“generally prohibit or punish, in its capacity as sovereign, speech
on the ground that it does not touch upon matters of public
concern.”130 Although speech on matters of public concern may
occupy the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,”131 the Court has also pointed out that First Amendment
protection is not limited to speech on the highest rung.132 As the
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (greater First Amendment protection available to speech
involving matters of public concern than speech involving matters of private concern).
127 Compare Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he Court has frequently reaffirmed
that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n for
Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)))),
with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
(“[S]peech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47)). Accordingly, “when a public employee speaks not
as a citizen on matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters of
only personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision.” Connick, 461
U.S. at 147 (citations omitted).
128 See Snyder, 562 U.S. 443, (speech on matters of public concern is protected
from liability as defamation).
129 The Supreme Court has exhibited concern that public employment should
not give a public employee the ability to “constitutionalize” employment disputes, but
has also preserved the employee’s right to pursue a positive constitutional cause of action
where a matter of public concern is involved. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. See Connick, 461
U.S. at 147 (“[A]n employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public
concern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a
libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street.”).
130 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008) (citing Connick, 461
U.S. at 147).
131 Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 467 (1980)).
132 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
763 n.17 (1976) (“[I]n some circumstances speech of an entirely private and economic
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Court observed in Thomas, “[g]reat secular causes, [along] with
small[er] ones, are guarded” by the First Amendment.133 Artistic
expression,134 commercial advertisements,135 video games,136 and
even untruthful boasts of military commendations137 are
generally free from government prohibition and punishment,
even though the Court has not viewed these as involving or
likely to involve matters of public concern.
Supporting this conclusion is the Court’s jurisprudence
in cases protecting speech that affects associational interests,
even where such speech involves matters of private concern. For
example, where states have sought to prevent organizations from
hiring attorneys to pursue members’ workers compensation
claims or other personal legal matters, the Court has ruled that
such regulation impermissibly interferes with First Amendment
associational freedoms.138 The Court was not swayed by the
argument that the First Amendment ought not to apply because
the legal assistance did not involve political speech or matters of
public concern.139 Since associational rights are derivative of
explicit First Amendment rights,140 such a result is consistent
with the idea that speech involving matters of private concern is
generally entitled to full First Amendment protection.
In any event, the UPL regulations at issue in Cramer and
Brumbaugh do not make a distinction based on whether a
nonlawyer’s legal advice deals with a matter of public concern.
The advice about divorce given by the nonlawyers in these two
cases arguably involved the same matter of private concern
whether offered to a group in a public forum or to a particular
individual. State UPL restrictions are only concerned with the
context in which the legal advice is conveyed and provide no
character enjoys the protection of the First Amendment.”); United Mine Workers of Am.,
Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (“[T]he First Amendment does
not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political.”).
133 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
134 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(“[E]sthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to
make, not for the Government to decree.”).
135 See infra note 183.
136 See Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
137 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724–29 (2012).
138 See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 578-79
(1971); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223
(1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Va. St. Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
139 United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223 (“The litigation in question is, of course,
not bound up with political matters of acute social moment, . . . but the First Amendment
does not protect speech . . . only to the extent it can be characterized as political.”).
140 Associational freedom is “an implicit guarantee of the First Amendment.” In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972)).
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greater protection for legal advice involving matters of public
concern than matters of private concern.141
It would in fact be difficult for state UPL prohibitions to
make a distinction based on whether the legal advice of a
nonlawyer involves a matter of public concern. This difficulty is
inherent in the very concept of “public concern.”142 Some people
who pursue lawsuits, which, after all, take place in the public
justice system, view their legal matters as not only personally
important but also vested with some more general social
significance.143 For example, a person who challenges a denial of
public assistance may be at the same time pursuing a personal
source of income and trying to bring attention to an issue or
problem of “poverty law,” as may be the lawyer or nonlawyer
who assists her.144 The distinction the Supreme Court has made
between matters of private and public concern might be
workable in the context of assessing liability in a defamation or
wrongful discharge case. But a UPL restriction that was
applicable against nonlawyers’ legal advice in situations
involving matters of private concern but not public concern
would put a state in the untenable position of determining what
is a legitimate matter of public concern and what is not.145
The fact that legal advice is not publicly communicated
does not, under existing precedent, remove it from First
Amendment protection. The courts in cases like Cramer and
Brumbaugh have imported into First Amendment analysis the
distinction often made in state UPL regulations between legal
advice to the general public and to particular individuals,
without explaining what makes it relevant. In fact, the Supreme
Court has expressly repudiated the idea that the size of the
audience for a communication affects constitutional protection,
141 See supra notes 106–114 and accompanying text.
142 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“We noted a short time
ago[ ] . . . that ‘the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined.’ . . . [T]hat
remains true today.” (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004))).
143 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), where the Court observes: “In
the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means of achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment . . . . It
is thus a form of political expression.” Id. at 429; see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427–28.
144 See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural
Constitutional LawCourse, 34 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1239, 1241 (2007) (“As a form of practice
with transformative aspirations, poverty law might . . . be taken to mean one or more of
the alternative models of lawyering pursued by some poverty lawyers that generally reject
the hierarchies of the conventional lawyer-client relationship, favor work in alliance with
social change movements, community organizations, and client groups, and envision a
more facilitative and collaborative role for the attorney.” (footnote omitted)).
145 Cf. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“The Free Speech
Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized
that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”).
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and has protected matters of private concern nearly as
aggressively as matters of public concern.146
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Although courts and commentators have not given an
adequate justification for their conclusion that UPL restrictions
suppressing and punishing nonlawyers’ legal advice do not
violate the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, that does not
mean that such restrictions are necessarily unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of the
First Amendment protection of nonlawyers’ legal advice,147 so
any constitutional analysis must be done inferentially. However,
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence indicates
that UPL rules that prohibit nonlawyers from giving legal advice
are probably unconstitutional, because they are content-based
restrictions that do not appear to serve a compelling state
interest, and most especially are not narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest.
146 See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 6100 (2008), 610;
United Mine Workers, 389 at 223.
147 The closest the Supreme Court has ever come is probably Fla. Bar v.
Furman, 376 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, Furman v. Fla. Bar,
444 U.S. 1061 (1980). Furman had allegedly “engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law by giving legal advice and by rendering legal services in connection with marriage
dissolutions and adoptions.” Id. at 379. She took the position that the UPL restrictions
“violate[d] the first amendment to the United States Constitution by restricting her right
to disseminate and the right of her customers to receive information which would allow
indigent litigants access to the state’s domestic relations courts.” Id. When the Court
dismissed her appeal, it amounted to a decision on the merits because of the
jurisdictional statute in effect at the time (28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970)), which the Court had
interpreted as meaning that dismissals of appeals amounted to decisions on the merits
of the case, functioning as binding precedent for lower courts. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 343–45 (1975). But it is difficult to say what exactly is the precedential content
of such decisions, as the Court itself acknowledged. See id. at 345 n.14 (“[a]scertaining
the reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real substance”).
The only court that has considered the impact of the Supreme Court’s dismissal in
Furman concluded that it was not a binding precedent on the constitutional issues raised
in the case, because of the varying possible understandings of the question being posed.
Dunn v. Fla. Bar, 726 F. Supp. 1261, 1271 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Indeed, the jurisdictional
statement for the Furman appeal was not styled as a claim about the free speech rights
of nonlawyers and so a dismissal would not qualify in any event as setting precedent on
that issue. (In an email of 10/28/12, Alan Morrison, who represented Furman, confirmed
that theirs was not a speech-based First Amendment argument but a right of petition-
based argument. Email from Alan Morrison to author (Oct. 28, 2012) (on file with
author)). Further, the statutory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court changed in 1988 to
make such cases subject to certiorari review only. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100–352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)). Cases in
which certiorari is denied are not decisions on the merits, and have no precedential
significance. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 94 n.11 (1983) (“[D]enials of
certiorari have no precedential force.”). In any event, the courts that have addressed the
First Amendment free speech rights of nonlawyers have not cited the dismissal of the
appeal in Furman as any kind of precedent on the issue.
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A. The Court’s View of Nonlawyers who Give Legal Advice
It seems likely from the denial of certiorari in a number
of cases discussed in this article that the Supreme Court has not
been eager to grapple with the First Amendment implications of
nonlawyers giving legal advice.148 It is possible that the Supreme
Court’s apparent reluctance has empowered lower courts to get
away with the skeletal and problematic rulings in this area that
have been described in this article.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not generally
been hostile to the idea of nonlawyers giving legal advice. In
NAACP v. Button, for example, some of the petitioners accused of
violating a state professional regulation against the solicitation of
legal business were nonlawyers who gave legal advice to persons
with potential civil rights lawsuits.149 The Court was not only
sensitive to the impact the UPL statute had on these nonlawyers
but also supportive of their right to express their views and
opinions on the law to potential legal clients.150 That does not, of
course, indicate how nonlawyers’ legal advice in general would
fare under a First Amendment free speech analysis. It does
suggest at least that any state regulation of nonlawyers’ legal
advice that involves political speech and associational rights
would probably violate the First Amendment rights of
nonlawyers as well as lawyers.
The Supreme Court also took the side of nonlawyers in
Johnson v. Avery, when it found that the state could not use its
professional licensing provisions to prevent prisoners from
giving other prisoners legal advice and assistance in the
preparation of their habeas corpus petitions.151 The Court
disagreed that “the interest of the State . . . in limiting the
practice of law to licensed attorneys justified whatever burden
148 See discussion supra Section 1.A (discussing People v. Shell, 148 P3d 162
(Colo. 2006), cert denied, 550 U.S. 971 (2007)); discussion supra Section I.B (discussing
Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992
(1993)); discussion supra Section I.C (discussing Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on
Unauthorized Practice of Law. v. O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200 (Mont. 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 1282 (2007)); see also discussion supra Section I.D (discussing State Bar v. Cramer,
249 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1976) (per curiam)).
149 Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 434–
35 (1963).
150 The Supreme Court noted that “even mere NAACP members or
sympathizers would understandably hesitate, at an NAACP meeting or on any other
occasion, to . . . acquaint persons with what they believe to be their legal rights
and . . . [advise] them to assert their rights by commencing or further prosecuting a suit,”
as “lawyers and nonlawyers alike” would face criminal prosecution under the statute. Id.
at 434–35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
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the regulation might place on access to federal habeas corpus.”152
The Court emphasized that treating such lay assistance as UPL
would essentially deprive inmates of their ability to seek
redress, and agreed with the district court’s conclusion that “for
all practical purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the
assistance of a ‘jail-house lawyer,’ their possibly valid
constitutional claims will never be heard in any court.”153 The
Supreme Court thus refused to endorse the idea that the state
could limit the provision of legal advice to attorneys only, and
suggested that practical impediments to obtaining the
assistance of a lawyer might justify the resort to nonlawyers,
notwithstanding UPL regulations to the contrary.
In Shaw v. Murphy, the Court did decline to expand the
right of prisoners to give other prisoners legal advice to include
correspondence between prisoners.154 However, in that case, the
state’s expressed interest was not the regulation of professional
practice, as in Johnson, but the “legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system.”155 Further, the state cited
examples of communications deleterious to prison discipline and
safety that had occurred by means of the pretext of inmate legal
advice in written correspondence.156 The Court indicated that the
First Amendment did apply to the situation, but ultimately
found that prisoners were subject to great limitations upon their
exercise of First Amendment rights because of the state’s
security needs.157
With its emphasis on prison security, Shaw does not
undermine the sense in Button and Johnson that the First
Amendment applies to nonlawyers’ legal advice and that
professional regulation may not provide adequate grounds for
interfering with such speech.158 Of course, these cases are not
indicative of a general perspective and might represent limited
exceptions to some general rule yet to be articulated by the Supreme
Court. But if there is a trend to be found in the Court’s closest
encounters with the issue (other than a trend of avoidance), it is
toward seeing such speech as protected by the First Amendment.
152 Id. at 485.
153 Id. at 487 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D. Tenn. 1966)).
154 Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
155 Id. at 229 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
156 Shaw, 532 U.S. at 231.
157 Id. at 229.
158 See Shaw, 532 U.S. at 231 (“Augmenting First Amendment protection for
inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials’ ability to address ‘complex and
intractable’ problems of prison administration.” (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
84 (1987))).
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B. The Applicable Analysis
The Supreme Court would likely regard UPL restrictions
on nonlawyers’ legal advice as content-based and therefore
subject to the most exacting First Amendment scrutiny. That a
content-based analysis applies is indicated by the Court’s
treatment of legal advice inHolder v.Humanitarian LawProject.159
That case involved a federal statute that forbade persons from
giving material aid, including aid in the form of “expert advice or
assistance,” to foreign terrorist organizations.160 The Court
specifically discussed the fact that legal advice was among the
kinds of “expert advice or assistance” forbidden by the statute.161
The government made arguments in that case that resemble those
used by some courts in finding that nonlawyers’ legal advice is not
protected by the First Amendment, including asserting the
proposition that legal advice is conduct, not speech.162
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the federal statute
regulates speech on the basis of its content. . . . If plaintiffs’ speech to
those groups imparts a “specific skill” or communicates advice derived
from “specialized knowledge”—for example, training on the use of
international law or advice on petitioning the United Nations—then
it is barred. On the other hand, plaintiffs’ speech is not barred if it
imparts only general or unspecialized knowledge.163
This analysis would seem to indicate that a state law that
prohibits a nonlawyer from communicating legal advice and
knowledge likewise involves a content-based restriction.164 As in
Humanitarian Law Project, the nonlawyer subject to prosecution
for UPL is free to speak to another person about anything that
does not relate to the law or that only generally relates to the law;
it is only advice derived from specialized knowledge of the law
that the nonlawyer is forbidden to communicate. Such “[c]ontent-
based restrictions are presumptively invalid” unless the speech
falls into some category the Court has recognized as subject to
traditional limitation, such as obscenity, defamation, and
159 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2010).
160 Id. at 8–9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b)(3), 2339B(g)(4) (2012)).
161 Id. at 36–37 (the Court indicated that the “plaintiffs propose to ‘train
members of [the] [alleged foreign terrorist organization] on how to use humanitarian and
international law to peacefully resolve disputes.’” (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v.
Mukasey, 522 F.3d 916, 921 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009))).
162 See discussion supra Section I.A.
163 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted).
164 This principle also seems to indicate that Justice White’s theory in Lowe,
that the state could prohibit speech it identified as professional speech, would itself
amount to a content-based restriction. Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 232
(1985) (White, J., concurring).
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“fighting words.”165 And the Court has remarked that “[i]t is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will
ever be permissible.”166
Further, UPL restrictions against nonlawyers’ legal
advice also discriminate against speech based on the identity of
the speaker. Lawyers are permitted by the state to give legal
advice, while nonlawyers are not. Such viewpoint discrimination
is also presumptively invalid.167 As the Court has observed, not
only are content-based restrictions constitutionally problematic
but “[p]rohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”168
That the UPL restrictions against nonlawyers’ legal advice are
based on both content and the identity of the speaker makes it
particularly likely that they would not be upheld: “In the
ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is
content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”169
In order for a content-based restriction to be upheld, it
must pass strict scrutiny—it must be “justified by a compelling
government interest” and the regulation must be “narrowly drawn
to serve that interest.”170 It is unlikely that UPL restrictions
against nonlawyers’ legal advice could pass the compelling
government interest requirement and almost certainly would not
pass the requirement that the restriction be narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest.
C. Compelling State Interest?
Courts have frequently identified the general purpose of
UPL restrictions as the protection of consumers.171 For example,
in Brumbaugh, the Florida court explained more specifically
165 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (citations omitted)
(quoting Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)); see also
Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
166 United States v. Playboy Entm’t. Grp., 529 U.S. 801, 818 (2000).
167 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557, 571 (2011) (statute
allowing some persons to purchase and use information about doctors’ prescribing habits
but not allowing certain pharmaceutical company representatives to do so was
unconstitutional insofar as it targeted particular speakers).
168 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (citing
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
169 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571.
170 Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (citation omitted).
171 See State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1986) (“The State has an
interest in licensing attorneys and making them the exclusive practitioners in their field
in order to protect the unwary and uninformed from injury at the hands of unqualified
persons performing legal services.”); State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1976)
(per curiam) (“Laymen are excluded from law practice, whatever law practice may be,
solely to protect the public.” (quoting Or. State Bar v. Sec. Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334,
338 (Or. 1962))).
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that legal advice from nonlawyers can be prohibited without
violating the First Amendment because of the “tendency” of
persons to place their reliance on those offering individualized
legal advice.172
However, the state interest in preventing consumer
reliance may be weaker with nonlawyers’ legal advice than with
legal assistance of other kinds. The consumer arguably places
more reliance on a nonlawyer who drafts a legal document on
the consumer’s behalf or who acts as her representative in a
legal proceeding, as in those situations the nonlawyer engages
in independent action to achieve the consumer’s interests. On
the other hand, where a nonlawyer simply gives the consumer
legal advice, more control and responsibility remain with the
consumer to evaluate and implement the advice. Accordingly,
the state may have less of a compelling interest in regulating the
giving of legal advice by nonlawyers than other activities
considered part of the practice of law.
In addition, the state’s interest presumably lies in
preventing detrimental reliance, not reliance that actually
benefits the consumer. But UPL restrictions against nonlawyers’
legal advice indiscriminately prevent all reliance. It is not evident
that detrimental reliance occurs always or even frequently.173 In
fact, in none of the cases described in this article does the court
indicate that the nonlawyer put the person assisted into a worse
situation as a result of giving legal advice than the person would
have been in without such advice. In Brumbaugh, for example,
the Florida court noted that “[d]uring the past two years
respondent has assisted several hundred customers in obtaining
their own divorces.”174 Consumers may rely on legal advice from
nonlawyers because it happens to be the best information
available to them or available at an affordable price, not because
they are misled as to its relative reliability. To the extent that
UPL restrictions against nonlawyers’ legal advice are intended
to protect consumers, they are seriously overinclusive, as they
deprive consumers of good as well as bad legal advice.175
Nonetheless, it could be said that the state has an
interest in having consumers obtain higher-quality legal advice
from lawyers rather than lower-quality legal advice from
nonlawyers. However, the First Amendment typically does not
172 Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193–94 (Fla. 1978).
173 See infra Section II.D; infra Part III (discussion of how state can decrease
the risk of detrimental reliance).
174 Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d at 1191.
175 See Brown, 564 U.S at 805 (state interests “must be pursued by means that
are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive”).
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permit the state to make the choice for people of what speech
they may hear or decide to listen to. The Supreme Court has
stated that “the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented.”176 The state cannot prohibit speech
“simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it”177 nor
“deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”178 In our
society, people receive advice all the time that could pose some
risk to them and that the government might prefer they not
hear—that urges them to forego the vaccination of their children,
tells them how to wire an electrical socket themselves, or
encourages them to make millions investing in real estate. The
Court has not generally allowed the state to paternalistically
restrain speech on the grounds that it presents some risk or is not
as good as other speech.
The state does have an interest in protecting those
consumers whomight be expected tomisperceive nonlawyers’ legal
advice as having a high level of trustworthiness and value as a
result of its resemblance to professional speech.179 Consumers’
limited understanding of the law and the legal profession leaves
them less capable of evaluating the quality of speech about the law
and perhaps more prone to trusting an appearance of expertise.
Nonetheless, in situations where nonlawyers do not engage in
misrepresentation,180 the likelihood that consumers will
overestimate nonlawyers’ legal advice does not seem high. Most
states apparently already trust that consumers will understand
that when a nonlawyer gives legal advice to a general audience,
such advice is not equivalent to the advice of a licensed attorney,
since in most states such speech is generally considered exempt
from regulation.181 In spite of the Supreme Court of Florida’s
176 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
177 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
178 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
179 See, e.g., Kry, supra note 38, at 967 (“Because state governments have
historically granted personalized advice monopolies to professionals whose speech the
government regulates, the public assumes that personalized speech is inherently
trustworthy, whether or not it is rendered by a professional.” (footnote omitted)).
180 In all the cases discussed in this article except O’Neil, there was no
accusation of misrepresentation. O’Neil presented his credentials in a misleading way
by advertising as an “independent paralegal” in the “attorney” section of the yellow pages
and describing himself as a “member” of the family law section of the state bar when he
was in fact an “associate member.” Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law v. O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 204–05 (Mont. 2006).
181 State law generally permits nonlawyers to give legal advice to a general
audience, although not to particular individuals. See discussion supra Section I.D. The
Florida court in Brumbaugh stated regarding the materials on divorce that the
nonlawyer had prepared that “[w]e must assume that our citizens will generally use such
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assumption in Brumbaugh, it seems unlikely that consumers
would imagine advice from a nonlawyer as somehow taking on an
aura of much greater value and reliability merely because it is
addressed to them personally as opposed to offered to a general
audience. But some presumably small number of vulnerable
consumers would be protected from misunderstanding
nonlawyers’ legal advice by a regulation that prevents them from
ever hearing it. Speech that would not be problematic for most
people to hear is not, however, usually censorable on the ground
that it could harm the vulnerable few.182
It may be that there is a compelling state interest in
preventing nonlawyers from giving legal advice, but it is not
obvious that such is the case.
D. Narrowly Drawn?
Themore difficult part of the test for the state tomeet is the
requirement that its regulation of speech be “narrowly drawn.”
Blanket bans of the kind that apply to nonlawyers’ legal advice
present particular difficulties in meeting this requirement. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has seldom allowed for blanket bans, even in
commercial speech cases.183 And the Court has held that when the
publications for what they are worth in the preparation of their cases, and further
assume that most persons will not rely on these materials in the same way they would
rely on the advice of an attorney or other persons holding themselves out as having
expertise in the area.” Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1978).
182 To prohibit all legal advice from nonlawyers because of a risk to more
vulnerable consumers is something like banning all speech because children might hear
it. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), in which the Supreme
Court declined to protect vulnerable children by censoring the speech that adults could
hear. In Reno, the Court emphasized that government may not “reduc[e] the adult
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children,” and noted that it had previously
refused to censor mail that might fall into the hands of minors, on the grounds that “[t]he
level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be
suitable for a sandbox.” Id. at 875 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v.
Fed. Commc’ns. Comm’n, 518 U. S. 727, 759 (1996); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1983)). The Court also likened such regulations as “burn[ing]
the house to roast the pig.” Id. at 882 (quoting Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. Fed.
Commc’ns. Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989)).
183 For example, the Court recently struck down a ban on the advertisement of
“compounded drugs,” which the government argued had “complicated risks” that could
not be fully explained in advertisements, misleading consumers as to their safety.
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 386–87 (2002). The Court also has not
permitted blanket bans on advertising that the state claimed was particularly prone to
abuse or involved abuses that were difficult to police. The Court has remarked in such a
case that
broad prophylactic rules may not be so lightly justified if the protections
afforded commercial speech are to retain their force. We are not persuaded that
identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of [such] advertising is so
intrinsically burdensome that the State is entitled to forgo that task in favor
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state burdens constitutionally-protected activities, it must choose
the “least restrictive means among available, effective
alternatives,”184 an approach that militates against blanket
bans. Ohralik may be the preferred precedent of courts to
address the situation of nonlawyers’ legal advice because it is
one of the very few Supreme Court decisions that have ever
permitted a blanket ban on commercial speech. In fact, since
Ohralik, the Court has repeatedly struck down blanket bans on
attorney commercial speech and has described the Ohralik
decision as depending on unique circumstances.185
Yet, in considering First Amendment challenges to UPL
restrictions against nonlawyers’ legal advice, courts do take the
position that such restrictions are narrowly drawn or no more
restrictive than necessary. For example, the Supreme Court of
Montana specifically concluded in O’Neil that the State’s UPL
restrictions were
narrowly tailored to target only the provision of legal services in
Montana by individuals who have not proven through examination
and admission to the bar that they “are qualified and possess a
familiarity with [Montana] law.” There remain ample alternative
channels for providing legal services to O’Neil’s customers—the
thousands of licensed attorneys in Montana.186
The court seems to be saying that because the UPL restrictions
only target nonlawyers, those regulations are therefore narrowly
drawn to achieve the state’s interest. However, a narrowly
drawn regulation would instead be one that reached no more
of the more convenient but far more restrictive alternative of a blanket
ban . . . .
Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel of SupremeCourt of Ohio, 471U.S. 626, 649 (1985).
184 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2002).
185 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993) (“Ohralik’s holding was
narrow and depended upon certain ‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers’
that were present in the circumstances of that case.” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
641)); see also Justice O’Connor’s dissent inEdenfield, which accused the Court of finding
“increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney advertising to be protected speech.” Id. at
778 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); “Despite Justice O’Conner’s [sic] plea for professionalism,
commercial speech still trumps most advertising limitations imposed on members of a
learned profession.” Ralph H. Brock, “This Court Took a Wrong Turn with Bates”: Why
the Supreme Court Should Revisit Lawyer Advertising, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 145, 169
(2009); R. Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: Current
Constitutional Parameters and Issues Under the First Amendment Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 24 CARDOZOARTS&ENT. L.J. 953, 1024 (2007) (Noting that the Supreme Court
has struck down various bans against lawyer advertising since 1980, and “since that
time, the Court has yet to find a regulated claim in professional services advertising
either inherently or actually misleading and, accordingly, devoid of First Amendment
protection.” (emphasis omitted)).
186 Mont. Supreme Court Comm’n on the Unauthorized Practice of Law v.
O’Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 214–15 (Mont. 2006) (quoting and citing Mothershed v. Justices of
Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 611–12 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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widely than necessary to achieve the state’s interests, not one
that was specific as to whose speech was prohibited. The
asserted fact that Montana has thousands of lawyers also does
not make the state’s regulation narrowly drawn; whether
O’Neil’s free speech rights have been violated is not answered by
referring to the existence of others who may speak freely on the
same matters. Indeed, that would amount to a speaker-based
discrimination which the Supreme Court has indicated is highly
problematic.187 And if the Montana court is suggesting that
O’Neil’s customers’ right to receive speech is taken care of by the
existence of such other speakers, that conclusion does not
address O’Neil’s customers’ right to hear his speech. (It further
assumes that those customers all can and should be required to
pay for lawyers in order to hear legal advice.) The Montana
court’s rationale for its decision does not describe a narrowly-
drawn regulation in the sense in which the Supreme Court
understands that concept.
Similarly, the SupremeCourt of North Dakota concluded in
Niska that the state’s UPL statute “curtails no more speech than
is essential to accomplish its purpose” and added that “[t]here are
numerous modes of communication not encompassing the practice
of law available for Niska to express his views.”188 The implication
is that because Niska was not prohibited from all
communications about the law—just the ones he actually
wanted to make—the state’s regulation was narrowly drawn.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he First
Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the
government, know best both what they want to say and how to
say it.”189 Or, as the Court has also put it, “[t]he First
Amendment protects [persons’] right not only to advocate their
cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective
means for so doing.”190 And “one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.”191 In short, the
state is not generally permitted to select the speaker’s audience
or mode of communication.192 The North Dakota court
187 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
188 State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 650 (N.D. 1986).
189 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1988).
190 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988).
191 Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
192 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (Supreme
Court rejecting the idea that restrictions on particular internet sites were constitutional
because speakers would still have other internet sites for engaging in speech). According
to the Court, such a “position is equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets
on certain subjects as long as individuals are free to publish books.” Id. at 880.
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accordingly does not present an adequate explanation in Niska
of why the state regulation should be considered narrowly drawn
to achieve the state interest.
Moreover, blanket bans on nonlawyers’ legal advice are
part of a panoply of measures used by states to address the threat
ofUPL to consumers, raising the possibility that the state’s interest
is in fact already adequately addressed by other regulations. For
example, states impose licensing requirements on lawyers, which
help consumers assess what kinds of legal advice to rely on and
what market value to assign to legal advice from varying sources.
It would therefore seem that the state already achieves much of its
interest simply by withholding licensure, and many of the
benefits that come with licensure, from those persons who do not
meet state standards, and also by making consumers aware of
which persons do meet such standards.193 Further, states
criminalize the behavior of falsely holding oneself out as a
lawyer,194 which helps achieve the state’s interest in protecting
consumers by deterring and punishing those nonlawyers who
would deceive consumers as to their qualifications.
In light of measures states already take and could take
going forward, the blanket ban on nonlawyers’ legal advice that
applies in most jurisdictions does not seem to be narrowly drawn
to achieve the state’s interest. It represents, in fact, the broadest
possible means of addressing the risks posed by nonlawyers’
legal advice. Such paternalistic and prophylactic bans have
seldom been accepted by the Supreme Court. Even if it could be
said that UPL restrictions against nonlawyers’ legal advice
achieve a compelling state interest, it seems unlikely that they
would be found to be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.
III. ENFORCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO IMPROVE ACCESS
TO JUSTICEWHILE PROTECTING CONSUMERS
Meaningful access to justice is important because people
need to have the ability to resolve their legal disputes and
193 In Alvarez, the Supreme Court suggested that the state could achieve its
interest, in preventing people from falsely claiming that they had received a military
medal, by simply setting up a database that listed medal recipients, against which false
claims could be checked. 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012). The bar of every state has listings of
attorneys that the public can access. See, e.g., Attorney Search, N.Y ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS.,
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/attorney/AttorneySearch [https://perma.cc/6NY4-H8BL].
194 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-302 (2017) (“Impersonation of licensed
professional. (a) It is unlawful for any person who is not licensed to do so, to practice or
pretend to be licensed to practice a profession for which a license certifying the
qualifications of the licensee to practice the profession is required. (b) A violation of this
section is a Class E felony.”).
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enforce their legal rights. But the fact is that many—and
perhaps most—people with civil legal problems must handle
them entirely on their own, without representation or guidance,
despite the byzantine complexity of the legal system.195 Few free
and affordable lawyers are available to assist them,196 and judges
and court clerks rigorously refrain from offering direction.197
Nonlawyers who might fill the gap are stymied from doing so by
UPL restrictions enforced by substantial civil and criminal
penalties.198 It is no wonder that the unrepresented have difficulty
obtaining outcomes that comport with the law.199
195 See, e.g., HANNAH E.M. LIEBERMAN & PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR,, TRENDS IN
STATE COURT: SPECIAL FOCUS ON FAMILY LAW AND COURT COMMUNICATIONS 90–91 (2016),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202016/Meeting-the-challenges.ashx
[https://perma.cc/936G-F9C3] (research conducted of ten urban counties in 2012–2013
showed that in only 16 percent of debt collection caseswere defendants representedby counsel
(compared to 98 percent of plaintiffs), 13 percent of defendants in landlord tenant cases
(compared to 80 percent of plaintiffs), and 13 percent of small claims cases (compared to 76
percent of plaintiffs)).
196 In constant dollars, Legal Services Corporation funding has declined from a
high of over $866 million in 1979 to a low of under $341 million in 2013. See Funding
History, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., http://archive.lsc.gov/congress/funding/funding-history
[https://perma.cc/L292-QCWC]. The current administration is not likely to fund the LSC
at even its recent lower levels. At the same time, funding provided by interest on lawyers’
trust accounts (IOLTA), which has been used to fund lawyers for the poor, drastically
declined over the last few years, from $371 million in 2007 to $93.2 million in 2011. See
Terry Carter, IOLTA programs find new funding to support legal services, ABA J., (Mar.
2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/iolta_programs_find_new_funding_
to_support_legal_services/ [https://perma.cc/FG9X-ETUM]; see also I. Glenn Cohen,
Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 221–22 (2013) (describing cuts to
Legal Services Corporation funding as well as reductions in other sources of funding for
legal services to the poor).
197 Many states’ court websites make clear that clerks are not allowed to give
legal advice. See, e.g., How Court Staff Can And Cannot Assist With Your Case, IND.
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/selfservice/2392.htm [https://perma.cc/
M38K-G98N] (In Indiana, court clerks “cannot provide legal advice or legal
interpretations. Only a lawyer can give . . . legal advice.”). Judges likewise consider
themselves constrained from providing legal advice. See, e.g., Robert Bacharach & Lyn
Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV.
19, 42 n.136 (2009) (“[G]iving legal advice is prohibited by multiple canons of judicial
conduct” and “a judge cannot ethically give legal advice to any of the parties, regardless of
whether they are pro se.” (citing Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges,Mediators, andClerks, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1987, 1988 (1999))); Engler, supra, at 1988 (“The rules primarily prohibit . . . court
players from giving legal advice to unrepresented litigants.”).
198 See, e.g., People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162 (2006), cert. denied, Shell v. Colo., 550
U.S. 971 (2007) (criminal contempt and fine of $6,000); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 6126(a) (2011) (“Any person . . . practicing law who is not an active member of the State
Bar[] . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by one year in a county jail or a fine of up
to one thousand dollars ($1000), or by both.”); FLA. STAT. § 454.23 (2004) (“Any person not
licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in this state who practices law in this
state . . . commits a felony of the third degree . . . .”); 42 PA. C.S. § 2524(a) (1976) (“[A]ny
person, . . . who within this Commonwealth shall practice law . . . without being an
attorney at law . . . commits a misdemeanor of the third degree upon a first violation.”).
199 See, e.g., Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research and
Recommendations, 19 CUNY L. REV. 57 (2015).
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The organized bar is, of course, far from indifferent to the
long-standing and serious problems with access to justice
experienced by the unrepresented. But its proposed solutions
have focused on improving the availability of lawyers, such as
through civil Gideon rules or rulings.200 These efforts have been
widely unavailing—no doubt because of their substantial cost—
and so have not actually improved the situation of the
unrepresented.201 A few bar-approved experiments are now
being undertaken that involve nonlawyers,202 but none change
the basic dynamic that only a lawyer can provide legal advice.More
significant improvements in access to justice could be accomplished
if courts could be persuaded to enforce the First Amendment and
recognize that nonlawyers are entitled to give legal advice.203 Such
recognition would enable trained and knowledgeable nonlawyers
to give the unrepresented more substantial guidance on how to
enforce their legal rights by allowing them to provide legal advice
tailored to a person’s situation.
Those who support existing restrictions often take the
position that they are necessary to protect consumers.204 The fear
is that persons with civil legal problems will be harmed by the
200 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a
Lawyer in Evictions Proceedings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 187, 204–06, 217 (2009); Michael
Millemann,Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question,
49 MD. L. REV. 18, 27, 47–48 (1990); Andrew Scherer, Why People Losing Their Homes
in Legal Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POLICY, &
ETHICS J. 699, 728 (2006).
201 See, e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003) (court declined to
address issue of appointed counsel raised by plaintiff and amici in case involving child
custody dispute); King v. King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. 2007) (no right to counsel under
State constitution in divorce case affecting mother’s custody and visitation rights to her
children); In the Matter of the Petition to Establish a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
2012 WI 14 (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf
?content=pdf&seqNo=78599 [https://perma.cc/7S4S-RXVB] (order of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin denying petition to establish right to counsel in civil cases); see also Turner
v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (no constitutional right to appointed counsel for civil
contempt).
202 See, e.g., efforts described in AM. B. ASS’N. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES, REPORTONTHEFUTUREOFLEGALSERVICES INTHEUNITEDSTATES 119–24 (2016).
203 Recognizing a constitutional right to give legal advice would not necessarily
enable nonlawyers to provide all kinds of legal assistance, as they would still be
prohibited by existing UPL regulations from drafting legal documents for persons or
representing persons in court. These other activities arguably have weaker First
Amendment claims and could perhaps be justifiably reserved to lawyers.
204 See, e.g., Dauphin County B. Assoc. v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229, 233 (Pa.
1976) (“[T]he object of the legislation forbidding practice to laymen is not to secure to
lawyers a monopoly, however deserved, but, by preventing the intrusion of inexpert and
unlearned persons in the practice of law, to assure to the public adequate protection in
the pursuit of justice.” (quoting Shortz v. Farrel, 193 A. 20, 24 (Pa. 1937))); Doe v.
McMaster, 585 S.E.2d 773, 775 n.3 (S.C. 2003) (“[T]his Court grounds its unauthorized
practice rules in the State’s ability to protect consumers in the state and not as a method
to enhance the business opportunities for lawyers.”).
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advice of nonlawyers.205 But the existing blanket bans on
nonlawyers giving legal advice are not only inimical to the First
Amendment but also are not the only or best way of
accomplishing the meaningful goal of protecting consumers.
Existing UPL restrictions sweep broadly: they prevent even
knowledgeable and capable nonlawyers from assisting the
unrepresented. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission have taken the position that UPL
restrictions prohibit legal assistance from nonlawyers in some
situations where consumers would benefit.206 A number of
prominent legal scholars have likewise criticized UPL
restrictions for interfering with access to justice.207
205 See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF.
89, 12 (2004) (describing entrusting government benefits, landlord-tenant disputes, and
consumer claims “to a corps of paraprofessionals” as involving “extraordinary dangers.”);
see also Ginn v. Farley, 403 A.2d 858, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (likening a
nonlawyer providing legal assistance as like an amateur performing “brain surgery”).
206 See Letter from Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Attorney General et al. to Task
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/comments-american-bar-associations-proposed-model-definition-
practice-law [https://perma.cc/SR3C-92EJ] (concerning the American Bar Association’s
plan to adopt a definition that stated that “a person is presumed to be practicing law when
engaging in any of the following conduct on behalf of another” including “[g]iving advice or
counsel to persons as to their legal rights or responsibilities”). The DOJ and FTC
urge[d] the ABA not to adopt the current proposed Definition, which, in our
judgment, is overbroad and could restrain competition between lawyers and
nonlawyers to provide similar services to American consumers. If adopted by
state governments, the proposed Definition is likely to raise costs for
consumers and limit their competitive choices. There is no evidence before the
ABA of which we are aware that consumers are hurt by this competition and
there is substantial evidence that they benefit from it.
Id.
207 See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 869, 885–86 (2009) (“Almost all of the scholarly experts and commissions
that have studied the issue have recommended increased opportunities for [lay]
assistance. Almost all of the major decisions by judges and bar associations have ignored
those recommendations.” (footnote omitted)); see also David Vladeck, Hard Choices:
Thoughts for New Lawyers, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 356 (2001) (“[T]he Bar has
refused to address the problem [of unmet needs for legal services] by easing restrictions
on non-lawyer practice. Concerns about the quality of lay assistance cannot be the real
answer because study after study has shown that trained lay advocates can effectively
represent people in standardized legal proceedings—and even in complex ones when they
are specially trained.” (footnotes omitted)); Gillian Hadfield, Making legal aid more
accessible and affordable, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/11/AR2010031103654.html [https://perma.cc/4LE4-7DL6]
(“The United States stands largely alone in advanced-market democracies in drastically
restricting where and how people can get help with their legal problems. In all states,
under rules created by bar associations and state supreme courts, only people with law
degrees and who are admitted to the state bar can provide legal advice and services of
any kind. . . . The United States urgently needs to expand capacity for non-lawyers to
meet the legal needs of ordinary Americans in innovative and less costly ways.”);
Laurence H. Tribe, Senior Counselor for Access to Justice, Speech at the ABA Pro Bono
Publico Awards Luncheon (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atj/opa/pr/speeches/
2010/atj-speech-100809.html [https://perma.cc/83WX-D7S7] (“[E]ven if all the lawyers in
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States and their bar associations do, of course, have
legitimate concerns about the risks and problems associated
with nonlawyers giving legal advice. It is no doubt true that
nonlawyers are less likely than lawyers to give accurate,
complete, and reliable legal advice, and that consumers might at
times rely on such advice to their detriment.208 Nonetheless, it is
not difficult to imagine situations where consumers would
benefit from having access to the advice of trained nonlawyers.
Such nonlawyers might sometimes give high-quality legal advice
for free or for a more affordable price than lawyers, and
consumers would therefore benefit from having access to it. The
legal advice of nonlawyers, even where it is not of high quality,
might still help the persons who receive it, because they cannot
afford or otherwise obtain the higher-quality advice of a lawyer,
and the advice they receive from the nonlawyer is still of
sufficient quality to put them in a better position than if they
had not received it. For some legal matters, a person might
rationally prefer a nonlawyer’s legal advice, even if taking such
advice is somewhat riskier, because a lawyer’s legal help may
cost too much in relation to the incremental benefits in risk-
reduction that it provides.
Moreover, there is an important difference between a
paternalistic regulation that purports to know what speech is
appropriate for another person to hear—thereby reducing the
person’s autonomy to make such a decision for herself—and a
protective regulation that ensures that the speech a person
hears does not mislead or deceive—a regulation which actually
enhances the efficacy of a person’s exercise of autonomy.
Accordingly, when it comes to the legal advice of nonlawyers, the
government can and should prohibit misleading and deceptive
speech, but not prevent the conveyance of speech that is merely
likely to be of lesser quality. False advertising, misrepresentation,
and other speech that victimizes consumers can be addressed and
arguably already are addressed under consumer protection laws,
without imposing the blanket bans and special form of prior
this room rededicated themselves to pro bono work, and we increased funding for civil
legal services five-fold, we still wouldn’t have enough lawyers to meet all the needs of
the poor and working class. . . . Work with your state bar associations to make sure that
rules of professional practice more realistically reflect the requirements for meeting
people’s desperate need for legal help—help that can come from those with background
and training different from our own.”).
208 But it is important to appreciate that the mere fact that such speech is likely
to be of lower quality than lawyers’ speech does not render it regulable. So-called “low-
value speech” is in fact generally protected by the First Amendment. As the Supreme
Court has observed, “the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 767 (1993).
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restraint that are accomplished by the restrictions on nonlawyer
speech invoked by attorney licensing provisions.
But it seems unlikely that allowing nonlawyers to give
legal advice will worsen the situation of the unrepresented, and it
is quite possible that it will benefit them. It is not as if the
unrepresented are not already getting advice about their legal
problems; they are probably conferring with friends, family,
neighbors, and coworkers, and taking into account whatever
impressions those persons have to offer. The law’s embargo on legal
advice fromanyperson except a lawyer guarantees that the only sort
of help the unrepresented receive will be random and haphazard.209
Even untrained nonlawyers becoming part of the situation is not
likely to domuch to worsen it. However, enforcement of nonlawyers’
free speech right to give legal advice would also permit the
introduction of trained and knowledgeable nonlawyers into the
picture and allow them to convey better assistance to the
unrepresented and help counteract misinformation.
In short, a nonlawyer’s legal advice, while no doubt
inferior to a lawyer’s legal advice in most situations, may still be
of substantial value to consumers. It makes little practical or
logical sense to say that because a lawyer’s legal advice is
generally more valuable, a consumer cannot be allowed to make
a rational choice to hear a nonlawyer’s legal advice that is
valuable enough in the consumer’s estimation.
There are, moreover, steps a state could take short of a
blanket ban against nonlawyers’ legal advice to improve the
ability of consumers to make optimal decisions when pursuing
legal matters. The state could require nonlawyers to issue
disclaimers and warnings to consumers who receive legal advice,
which would ensure that consumers have specific notice of the
risks of such advice. That would enable consumers to make more
informed decisions. Allowing legal advice from nonlawyers but
requiring such warnings and disclaimers has in fact been
recommended by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission210 and adopted by the District of Columbia as
the right regulatory approach.211
209 For example, allowing social justice organizations, community groups, and
universities to train persons to provide legal advice to the unrepresented could give
consumers better sources of assistance than they get through the informal consultations
they have with the untrained.
210 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, to
Susan Gray, Office of the Director of State Courts (Dec. 10, 2007) https://www.justice.gov/
atr/comments-petition-supreme-court-rule-07-09. [https://perma.cc/4UV5-LY8A]
211 D.C. CT. APP. RULE 49(b)(2) apparently allows nonlawyers to give legal
advice as long as they provide appropriate warnings to consumers. The Commentary to
§ 49(b)(2) explains that a prior version of the rule defined the practice of law
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The education of the public about the risks of nonlawyer
legal advice is another measure that states can take short of a
blanket ban on nonlawyers giving legal advice. In Bates, the
Supreme Court suggested that the bar underestimated the
public’s ability to evaluate lawyer advertising, but added that
“[i]f the naivete of the public will cause advertising by attorneys
to be misleading, then it is the bar’s role to assure that the
populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place
advertising in its proper perspective.”212 Likewise, the bar has
the incentive and the ability to inform the public of the risks
associated with nonlawyers’ legal advice, and to ensure that
consumers understand the difference between the legal advice of
lawyers and nonlawyers.
First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that even
where there are benefits from regulation, speech will be
protected so long as other feasible means exist to reduce the
harms that regulation seeks to address. And in such a situation
the burden then falls on the state to use those other means,
rather than simply subject the potentially problematic speech to
a blanket ban. The risk posed to consumers by allowing
nonlawyers to give legal advice could be minimized through
these less sweeping measures, while enabling unrepresented
persons to pursue their civil legal claims with more information
and guidance than are currently available to them.
CONCLUSION
Appellate courts that have considered free speech
challenges to the UPL restrictions on nonlawyers giving legal
advice have uniformly rejected such challenges—although based
on a wide variety of unconvincing rationales. Further, the best
reading of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
“broadly . . . , embracing every activity in which a person provides services to another
relating to legal rights.” Id. Under the revision, “[t]he presumption that one’s
engagement in one of the enumerated activities is the ‘practice of law’ may be rebutted
by showing that there is no client relationship of trust or reliance, or that there is no
explicit or implicit representation of authority or competence to practice law, or that both
are absent.” Id. Accordingly, a nonlawyer may give legal advice if proper warnings are
given. However,
[i]t is not sufficient for a person . . . merely to give notice that he is not a lawyer
while engaging in conduct that is likely to mislead consumers into believing he
is a licensed attorney at law. Where consumers continue to seek services after
such notice, the provider must take special care to assure that they understand
that the person they are consulting does not have the authority and
competence to render professional legal services in the District of Columbia.
Id.
212 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
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indicates that the blanket bans that most states have instituted
against nonlawyers giving legal advice probably violate the Free
Speech Clause.
These failures to protect free speech are impediments to
improving access to justice. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
charts a course that would enable the benefits of speech about
how to use the law to become more widely available and
accessible to those who most need it, while still allowing for the
regulation that provides consumers with substantial protection
from misleading and deceptive speech from nonlawyers. That
course is both more consistent with First Amendment doctrine
and more respectful of what it is that the First Amendment
attempts to achieve, the greater access of everyone to the
marketplace of information and ideas.
